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@ -420,106 +420,122 @@ and is not able to account for people or households moving to new dwellings.
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### Collective bargaining
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### Collective bargaining
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@Alexiou2023 study the effects of both political orientation of governments' parties and a country's trade unionisation on its income inequality.
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@Alexiou2023 take a macro-level perspective and investigate the impact of governmental party political orientation and trade unionisation levels on income inequality across countries.
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They find that, generally, strong unionisation is strongly related to decreasing income inequality, most likely through a redistribution of political power through collective mobilization in national contexts of stronger unions.
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The findings indicate a negative correlation between strong unionisation and income inequality,
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It also suggests that in contexts of weaker unionisation, post-redistribution income inequality is higher, thus also fostering unequal redistributive policies.
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attributed to enhanced political power redistribution via collective action in national contexts of powerful unions.
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Lastly, it finds positive relations between right-wing orientation of a country's government and its income inequality, with more mixed results for centrist governments pointing to potential fragmentations in their redistributive policy approaches.
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Regions with weak unionisation have higher income inequality post-redistribution,
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The study is mostly limited in not being able to account for individual drivers (or barriers) and can thus not disaggregate for the effects for example arbitration or collective bargaining.
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also generally indicating a propensity towards uneven redistributive policies.[^alexious-rightwing]
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@Dieckhoff2015 undertake a study on the effect of trade unionisation in European labour markets, with a specific emphasis on its effects on gender inequalities.
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[^alexious-rightwing]: The study observes a positive association between right-leaning governments and income inequality, whereas centrists exhibit varied outcomes, hinting at possible inconsistencies in their redistributive strategies. However, the study can not directly identify the causal factors within these relationships.
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It finds, first of all, that increased unionisation is related to the probability of being employed on a standard employment contract for both men and women.
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It also finds no evidence that men seem to carry increased benefits from increased unionisation alone,
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although in combination with temporary contract and family policy re-regulations, men can experience greater benefits than women.
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At the same time women's employment under standard contracts does not decrease, such that there is no absolute detrimental effect for either gender.
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It does, however, leave open the question of the allocation of relative benefits between the genders through unionisation efforts.
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The study is limited in that, by averaging outcomes across European nations, it can not account for nation-specific labour market contexts or gender disaggregations.
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@Cardinaleschi2019 study the wage gap in the Italian labour market, looking especially at the effects of collective negotiation practices.
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@Ahumada2023, taking the opposite approach,
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It finds that the Italian labour market's wage gap exists primarily due to occupational segregation between the genders, with women often working in more 'feminized' industries, and not due to educational lag by women in Italy.
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explore how imbalanced political power distributions affect the availability and strength of collective labor rights.[^ahumada-approach]
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It also finds that collective negotiation practices targeting especially managerial representation and wages do address the gender pay gap, but only marginally significantly.
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Generally, they concur that contexts characterized by significant power disparities weaken opportunities for collective bargaining,
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The primary channel for only marginal significance stems from internal heterogeneity in that only the median part of wage distributions is significantly affected by the measures.
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primarily due to either more restricted or disregarded labour rights coupled with less deeply rooted trade unionism.
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Instead, the authors recommend a stronger mix of policy approaches, also considering the human-capital aspects with for example active labour-market policies targeting it.
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In contrast, well establishes unionism curtails employers' lobbying efforts and make them susceptible to governments' divide-and-conquer strategies,
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being more separate and less coordinated.
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@Ferguson2015 conducts a study on the effects of a more unionised workforce in the United States, on the representation of women and minorities in the management of enterprises.
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[^ahumada-approach]: The study employes a mix of quantitative global comparisons and qualitative analyses more specifically focused on Argentina and Chile. Thus, the strong institutional context of the two countries provides an analytical background which makes its qualitative analysis more difficult to generalize the quantitative findings.
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It finds that while stronger unionisation is associated both with more women and more minorities represented in the overall workforce and in management, this effect is only marginally significant.
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Additionally, there are drivers which may be based on unobservables and not a direct effect ---
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it may be a selection effect of more unionised enterprises.
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It uses union elections as its base of analysis, and thus can not exclude self-selection effects of people joining more heavily unionised enterprises rather than unionisation increasing representation in its conclusions.
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@Ahumada2023 on the other hand create a study on the effects of unequal distributions of political power on the extent and provision of collective labour rights.
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Focusing on the intersection between collective organisation and gender more specifically,
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It is a combination of quantitative global comparison with qualitative case studies for Argentina and Chile.
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@Dieckhoff2015 examine the influence of trade unionisation on gender inequalities within European labour markets.
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It finds that, for societies in which power is more unequally distributed, collective bargaining possibilities are more limited and weaker.
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The study establishes a positive link between unionisation rates and the likelihood of standard employment contracts for both genders.
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It suggests that, aside from a less entrenched trade unionisation in the country, the primary channel for its weakening are that existing collective labour rights are often either restricted or disregarded outright.
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While it finds no direct advantage for men solely through increased unionisation,
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Employers were restricted in their ability to effectively conduct lobbying, and made more vulnerable to what the authors suggest are 'divide-and-conquer' strategies by government with a strongly entrenched trade unionisation, due to being more separate and uncoordinated.
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analysis in combination with temporary contracts and family policy reforms sees men experiencing greater benefits than women.
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A limit is the strong institutional context of the two countries which makes generalizable application of its underlying channels more difficult to the overarching quantitative analysis of inequality outcomes.
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There is no absolute detrimental effect for either gender as women's employment in standard contracts remains stable, however,
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it may be one factor towards an increase in relative inequality for women which would agree with the findings of @Davies2022.[^dieckhoff-limit]
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[^dieckhoff-limit]: The study's causal explanatory power is limited somewhat by its aggregate approach across countries precluding analysis for nation-specific labour market contexts or to disaggregate the gender findings.
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@Cardinaleschi2019 investigate turn to collective organisation's effects on the gender wage gap in Italy.
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They identify occupational segregation as the principal cause of wage disparity as opposed to educational inequalities,
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with women predominantly working in more 'feminized' industries.
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While collective bargaining practices specifically targeting managerial representation and wages show some reduction in the wage gap,
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the impact is only marginally significant.[^cardinaleschi-msg]
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The authors suggest a stronger mix of policy approaches such as including human capital development through well targeted active labour market policies.
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[^cardinaleschi-msg]: The marginal significance primarily stems from internal heterogeneity which only significantly affects the median part of wage distributions while the rest remains insignificant.
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@Ferguson2015 specifically examines the relationship between unionisation and the representation of women and minority groups in management positions within U.S. companies.
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It finds that while stronger unionisation is associated with higher representation of both in management and in the overall workforce,
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the effects are only marginally significant.
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Further, the study acknowledges potential confounding factors, such as selection biases,
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should more union-friendly enterprises attract individuals who support diversity.[^ferguson-limit]
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[^ferguson-limit]: The study bases its analysis on union elections, and thus can not exclude self-selection effects of people joining more heavily unionised enterprises rather than unionisation increasing representation.
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### Workfare programmes
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### Workfare programmes
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@Whitworth2021 analyse the spatial consequences of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases.
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@Whitworth2021 analyse the repercussions of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases.
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The programme follows a quasi-marketized approach of rewarding employment-favourable results of transitions into employment and further sustained months in employment.
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Despite adopting a quasi-market model rewarding positive employment outcomes,
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The author argues, however, that the non-spatial implementation of the policy leads to spatial outcomes.
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the study contends that the policy's non-spatial execution inadvertently exacerbates existing spatial disparities.
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Founded on the approach of social 'creaming' and 'parking' and applied to the spatial dimension,
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Applying concepts of "social creaming" and "parking" to spatial analysis,
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the study shows that already job-deprived areas indeed experience further deprivations under the programme,
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the study shows that areas already suffering from job deprivation experience further deterioration under the programme.
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while non-deprived areas are correlated with positive impacts, thereby further deteriorating spatial inequality outcomes.
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Meanwhile, wealthier regions may receive beneficial impacts in an attempt to enhance programme performance metrics,
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This occurs because of providers in the programme de-prioritizing the already deprived areas ('parking') in favour prioritizing wealthier areas for improved within-programme results.
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leading to the conclusion of bad targeting through neglecting spatial components.
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@Li2022 conduct a study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
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@Li2022 conduct a study on the effects of existing inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.[^li-nrega]
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It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
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Using land ownership inequality as a proxy for initial inequality levels,
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The study finds that there is significantly negative relationship between the Gini coefficient and the provision of jobs through the work programme.
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it finds a significant negative relationship to the provision of jobs through the programme.[^li-indicator]
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In other words, the workfare policy implemented at least in part to reduce a district's inequality seems to be less effective if there is a larger prior capital inequality.
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Primarily the authors identify resistance from landlords against programme expansion as the underlying mechanism ---
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The authors see the primary channel to be the landlords' opposition to broad workfare programme introduction since they are often followed by overall wage increases in the districts.
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its expansion often precedes wage hikes in the districts ---
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They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
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as they leverage their disproportionate power to influence politics or diminish collective bargaining possibilities.
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in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
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The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
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[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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[^li-nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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[^li-indicator]: The study uses the Gini coefficient as an indicator for these initial conditions of ownership inequalities and thus concludes the programme being significantly compromised through higher pre-existing capital inequality. The findings also hold true when measuring land inequality as the share of land owned by the top 10 percent of holders.
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### Social protection
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### Social protection
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<!-- TODO Should we include Pi2016 on social security? -->
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<!-- TODO Should we include Pi2016 on social security? -->
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<!-- social assistance benefits and wages -->
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<!-- social assistance benefits and wages -->
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@Wang2016 undertake an observational study on the levels of social assistance benefits and wages in a national comparative study within 26 OECD countries.
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@Wang2016 conduct a comparative study on social assistance benefits and wages across 26 OECD countries from 1990 to 2009.
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It finds that real minimum income benefit levels generally increased in most countries from 1990 to 2009, with only a few countries, mostly in Eastern European welfare states, showing decreases during the time frame.
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The analysis finds an overall increase in real minimum income benefits in most countries, mostly excepting Eastern European countries,
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The majority of changes in real benefit levels are from deliberate policy changes and the study calculates them by a comparison of the changes in benefit levels to the changes in consumer prices.
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attributing these changes to deliberate policy adjustments rather than inflation.[^wang-channel]
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Secondly, it finds that changes for income replacement rates are more mixed, with rates decreasing even in some countries which have increasing real benefits levels.
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However, results for income replacement rates vary,
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The study suggests this is because benefit levels are in most cases not linked to wages and policy changes also do not take changes in wages into account resulting in diverging benefit levels and wages, which may lead to exacerbating inequality gaps between income groups.
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with some countries experiencing decreases despite rising real benefits.
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The authors suggest this discrepancy is explained by the decoupling of benefit levels from wages and the absence of wage considerations in policy changes, potentially exacerbating income inequalities between income groups.
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[^wang-channel]: The study calculates the rise in real benefit levels by comparing the changes in benefit levels to the changes in consumer prices.
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<!-- conditional cash transfer -->
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<!-- conditional cash transfer -->
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@Debowicz2014 conduct a study looking at the impact of the cash transfer programme Oportunidades in Mexico, conditioned on a household's children school attendance, on income inequality among others.
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@Debowicz2014 evaluate the impact of the cash transfer programme Oportunidades on income inequality in Mexico.[^debowicz-oportunidades]
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It finds that a combination of effects raises the average income of the poorest households by 23 percent.
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The study reports an increase of 23 percent in the average income of the poorest households,
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The authors argue in the short run this benefits households through the direct cash influx itself, as well as generating a positive wage effect benefitting those who keep their children at work.
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attributed to both the direct cash influx and the beneficial effect for parents keeping their children in school.
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For the estimation of income inequality it uses the Gini coefficient.
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Over the long term, there is a benefit for children whose human capital increases due to the programme.
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Additionally, over the long-term for the children in the model there is a direct benefit for those whose human capital is increased due to the programme, but also an indirect benefit for those who did not increase their human capital, because of the increased scarcity of unskilled labor as a secondary effect.
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There are also indirect benefits for children whose human capital did not increase,
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Due to the relatively low cost of the programme if correctly targeted, it seems to have a significantly positive effect on the Mexican economy and its income equality.
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due to increased scarcity of unskilled labour as a secondary effect,
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thus suggesting a positive economic impact if correctly targeted.
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In a study on the labour force impacts for women @Hardoy2015 look at the effects of reducing overall child care costs in Norway through subsidies.
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[^debowicz-oportunidades]: The Oportunidades programme conditions its cash benefits on the school attendance of a household's children. While this review focuses on the results for income inequality using the Gini coefficient, other indicators are also reported in the full study.
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It finds that overall the reductions in child care cost increased the female labour supply in the country (by about 5 per cent),
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while there were no significant impacts on mothers which already participated in the labour market.
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<!-- childcare subsidy -->
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It also finds some internal heterogeneity, with the impact being strongest for low-education mothers and low-income households,
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Investigating the impact of childcare subsidies on the female labour force,
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a finding the authors expected due to day care expenditure representing a larger part of those households' budgets thus creating a larger impact.
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@Hardoy2015 find an overall increase in female labour supply (roughly 5 percent),
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Though it may alternatively also be generated by the lower average pre-intervention employment rate for those households.
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though without significant impact on mothers already participating in the labour market.
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Interestingly when disaggregating by native and immigrant mothers there is only a significant impact on native mothers,
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Notably, the impact was greatest for low-education mothers and low-income households since their daycare expenditures constitute a larger budgetary share,
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though the authors do not form an inference on why this difference would be.
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though it may also be due to lower pre-intervention employment rates for those households.[^hardoy-limits]
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A limitation of the study is that there was a simultaneous child care capacity increase in the country,
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which may bias the labour market results due to being affected by both the cost reduction and the capacity increase.
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[^hardoy-limits]: There was a concurrent increase in childcare capacity which potentially biases the results due to the simultaneous cost reductions and capacity increases. Interestingly, significant effects were only observed among native mothers when disaggregating between migrant and native-born, though reasons for the distinction remain unspecified.
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<!-- health care -->
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<!-- health care -->
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@Carstens2018 conduct an analysis of the potential factors influencing mentally ill individuals in the United States to participate in the labour force, using correlation between different programmes of Medicaid and labour force status.
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@Carstens2018 analyse the factors affecting labour force participation rates of mentally ill individuals in the US,
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In trying to find labour force participation predictors it finds employment motivating factors in reduced depression and anxiety, increased responsibility and problem-solving and stress management being positive predictors.
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correlating it with various Medicaid programmes.
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In turn increased stress, discrimination based on their mental, loss of free time, loss of government benefits and tests for illegal drugs were listed as barriers negatively associated with labour force participation.
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Key motivators for participation are determined to be reduced depression and anxiety for which positive predictors are increased responsibility, problem-solving and stress management.
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For the government benefits, it finds significant variations for the different varieties of Medicaid programmes, with the strongest negative labour force participation correlated to Medicaid ABD, a programme for which it has to be demonstrated that an individual cannot work due to their disability.
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Identified barriers include increased stress, discrimination based on mental state, loss of free time, tests for illegal drugs and loss of government benefits.
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The authors suggest this shows the primary channel of the programme becoming a benefit trap, with disability being determined by not working and benefits disappearing when participants enter the labour force, creating dependency to the programme as a primary barrier.
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Medicaid ABD (Aged, Blind, Disabled) additionally had a strong negative correlation with participation,
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Two limitations of the study are its small sample size due to a low response rate, and an over-representation of racial minorities, women and older persons in the sample mentioned as introducing possible downward bias for measured labour force participation rates.
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due to its requirement of demonstrating inability to work creating a negative dependency loop.[^carstens-limits]
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[^carstens-limits]: This loop may create a benefit trap with disability determined through abstention from the labour market and benefits disappearing when entering the labour force. The overall identified barriers may, however, be skewed upwards due to an over-representation of racial minorities, women and older individuals in the study's relatively small sample size.
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<!-- UBI -->
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<!-- UBI -->
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<!-- TODO Potentially mention single sentence of Standing also looking into UBI -->
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<!-- TODO Potentially mention single sentence of Standing also looking into UBI -->
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@Cieplinski2021 undertake a simulation study on the income inequality effects of both a policy targeting a reduction in working time and the introduction of a UBI in Italy.
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@Cieplinski2021 conducted a simulation study on a working hours reduction and introduction of UBI in Italy,
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It finds that while both decrease overall income inequality, measured through Gini coefficient, they do so through different channels.
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finding that both decreased overall income inequality through different mechanisms.
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While provision of a UBI sustains aggregate demand, thereby spreading income in a more equitable manner,
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UBI sustains aggregate demand, promoting more equtiable income distribution,
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working time reductions significantly decrease aggregate demand through lower individual income but significantly increases labour force participation and thus employment.
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while working time reductions significantly decrease aggregate demand through lower individual incomes,
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It also finds that through these channels of changing aggregate demand, the environmental outcomes are oppositional, with work time reduction decreasing and UBI increasing the overall ecological footprint.
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but in turn increases overall labour force participation and employment.[^cieplinski-notes]
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One limitation of the study is the modelling assumption that workers will have to accept both lower income and lower consumption levels under a policy of work time reduction through stable labour market entry for the results to hold.
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[^cieplinski-notes]: Through these mechanisms environmental outcomes are also oppositional, with work time reduction decreasing the ecological footprint while UBI increases it. However, these results only hold for the assumption that workers will have to accept both lower income and consumption levels (through stable labour market entry) under reduction of working time.
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## Structural factors
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## Structural factors
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