feat(script): Shorten workfare programmes
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@ -466,24 +466,23 @@ should more union-friendly enterprises attract individuals who support diversity
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### Workfare programmes
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@Whitworth2021 analyse the spatial consequences of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases.
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The programme follows a quasi-marketized approach of rewarding employment-favourable results of transitions into employment and further sustained months in employment.
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The author argues, however, that the non-spatial implementation of the policy leads to spatial outcomes.
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Founded on the approach of social 'creaming' and 'parking' and applied to the spatial dimension,
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the study shows that already job-deprived areas indeed experience further deprivations under the programme,
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while non-deprived areas are correlated with positive impacts, thereby further deteriorating spatial inequality outcomes.
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This occurs because of providers in the programme de-prioritizing the already deprived areas ('parking') in favour prioritizing wealthier areas for improved within-programme results.
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@Whitworth2021 analyse the repercussions of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases.
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Despite adopting a quasi-market model rewarding positive employment outcomes,
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the study contends that the policy's non-spatial execution inadvertently exacerbates existing spatial disparities.
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Applying concepts of "social creaming" and "parking" to spatial analysis,
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the study shows that areas already suffering from job deprivation experience further deterioration under the programme.
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Meanwhile, wealthier regions may receive beneficial impacts in an attempt to enhance programme performance metrics,
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leading to the conclusion of bad targeting through neglecting spatial components.
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@Li2022 conduct a study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
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It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
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The study finds that there is significantly negative relationship between the Gini coefficient and the provision of jobs through the work programme.
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In other words, the workfare policy implemented at least in part to reduce a district's inequality seems to be less effective if there is a larger prior capital inequality.
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The authors see the primary channel to be the landlords' opposition to broad workfare programme introduction since they are often followed by overall wage increases in the districts.
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They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
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in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
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The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
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@Li2022 conduct a study on the effects of existing inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.[^li-nrega]
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Using land ownership inequality as a proxy for initial inequality levels,
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it finds a significant negative relationship to the provision of jobs through the programme.[^li-indicator]
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Primarily the authors identify resistance from landlords against programme expansion as the underlying mechanism ---
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its expansion often precedes wage hikes in the districts ---
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as they leverage their disproportionate power to influence politics or diminish collective bargaining possibilities.
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[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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[^li-nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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[^li-indicator]: The study uses the Gini coefficient as an indicator for these initial conditions of ownership inequalities and thus concludes the programme being significantly compromised through higher pre-existing capital inequality. The findings also hold true when measuring land inequality as the share of land owned by the top 10 percent of holders.
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### Social protection
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