Add wos sample results library

02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/9e2b0e82cb3215812c245adb3e37cb05-chen-ying-ju-and-se/info.yaml

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+abstract: 'The reservation of goods to be produced in the micro, small, and medium
+
+  enterprises (MSME) sector, in the early years after India''s
+
+  independence, addressed the dual needs of development of the industrial
+
+  sector and production of goods. However, these industrial policies
+
+  created an incentive for firms to remain small so that they can continue
+
+  to avail of the benefits provided by the Government. On the positive
+
+  side, the MSMEs typically employ more labor intensive production
+
+  processes and consequently contribute significantly to the provision of
+
+  employment opportunities, generation of income, and poverty reduction.
+
+  But, on the negative side, the policies have also partly facilitated the
+
+  creation of a divide in terms of productivity between the MSMEs and
+
+  large sized firms. In particular the policy raises important questions
+
+  for a firm auctioning supply contracts among suppliers with a
+
+  significant cost differential. In this paper we propose an idea to
+
+  allocate supply contracts wherein a manufacturing firm partitions the
+
+  stochastic demand into mutually exclusive portions and awards each
+
+  portion to a different supplier. We characterize such an optimal
+
+  procurement mechanism when there are two types of suppliers and an
+
+  arbitrary number of demand portions. We show that the optimal
+
+  procurement may require the manufacturer to intentionally withhold some
+
+  demand portion, and this arises when one type of supplier is
+
+  considerably inefficient in serving a demand portion. We extend our
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+  analysis to the cases with multiple types with two suppliers and two
+
+  types with multiple suppliers. The optimal partition is composed of at
+
+  most six contiguous demand portions, and it may include a detrimental
+
+  demand portion that only generates a negative expected payoff to both
+
+  supplier types. Our demand partitioning mechanism leads to a strictly
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+  higher manufacturer''s expected payoff than the conventional
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+  winner-take-all case unless one supplier type completely dominates the
+
+  other. We present numerical experiments that indicate when such a
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+  mechanism holds the greatest advantage for the buyer.'
+affiliation: 'Sohoni, MG (Corresponding Author), Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad, India.
+
+  Chen, Ying-Ju, Hong Kong Univ Sci \& Technol, Sch Business \& Management, Clear
+  Water Bay, Hong Kong, Peoples R China.
+
+  Chen, Ying-Ju, Hong Kong Univ Sci \& Technol, Sch Engn, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong,
+  Peoples R China.
+
+  Seshadri, Sridhar, Univ Illinois, Gies Coll Business, Urbana, IL 61801 USA.
+
+  Sohoni, Milind G., Indian Sch Business, Hyderabad, India.'
+author: Chen, Ying-Ju and Seshadri, Sridhar and Sohoni, Milind G.
+author-email: milind\_sohoni@isb.edu
+author_list:
+- family: Chen
+  given: Ying-Ju
+- family: Seshadri
+  given: Sridhar
+- family: Sohoni
+  given: Milind G.
+da: '2023-09-28'
+doi: 10.1002/nav.21953
+earlyaccessdate: NOV 2020
+eissn: 1520-6750
+files: []
+issn: 0894-069X
+journal: NAVAL RESEARCH LOGISTICS
+keywords: demand partitioning; industrial policy; mechanism design; procurement
+keywords-plus: INFORMATION; AUCTIONS; POLICIES
+language: English
+month: DEC
+number: 8, SI
+number-of-cited-references: '21'
+orcid-numbers: 'Sohoni, Milind/0000-0002-5236-2375
+
+  Sohoni, Milind/0000-0003-0510-7109'
+pages: 1037-1053
+papis_id: a92970e60cbe833923d539fda80f999a
+ref: Chen2021demandpartitioning
+researcherid-numbers: 'Sohoni, Milind/E-4894-2015
+
+  chen, ying/HHS-8254-2022
+
+  Sohoni, Milind/E-4894-2015'
+times-cited: '2'
+title: A demand partitioning framework to reserve production for small enterprises
+type: Article
+unique-id: WOS:000586041700001
+usage-count-last-180-days: '3'
+usage-count-since-2013: '29'
+volume: '68'
+web-of-science-categories: Operations Research \& Management Science
+year: '2021'