Add wos sample results library

02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/5205c098b8cee3fbe862cd1e675c77ca-fernandez-raquel-an/info.yaml

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+abstract: 'During the 1970s, the United States switched from mutual consent to a
+
+  unilateral divorce regime. Who benefited/lost from this change? We
+
+  develop a dynamic life cycle model in which agents make consumption,
+
+  saving, work, and marital-status decisions under a given divorce regime.
+
+  Calibrating the model to match key moments for the 1940 cohort and
+
+  conditioning solely on gender, our ex ante welfare analysis finds that
+
+  women fare better under mutual consent whereas men prefer a unilateral
+
+  system. Conditioning as well on initial productivity (expected income),
+
+  we find that the top three quintiles of men and the top two quintiles of
+
+  women prefer unilateral divorce.'
+affiliation: 'Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), NYU, Dept Econ, 19 W 4th St, New
+  York, NY 10012 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), CEPR, Washington, DC 61942 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), IZA, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), ESOP, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Fernandez, R (Corresponding Author), BREAD, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, NYU, Dept Econ, 19 W 4th St, New York, NY 10012 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, NBER, Cambridge, MA 02138 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, CEPR, Washington, DC 61942 USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, IZA, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, ESOP, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Fernandez, Raquel, BREAD, Washington, DC USA.
+
+  Wong, Joyce Cheng, Int Monetary Fund, 1900 Penn Ave NW, Washington, DC 20431 USA.'
+author: Fernandez, Raquel and Wong, Joyce Cheng
+author-email: 'raquel.fernandez@nyu.edu
+
+  jwong2@imf.org'
+author_list:
+- family: Fernandez
+  given: Raquel
+- family: Wong
+  given: Joyce Cheng
+da: '2023-09-28'
+doi: 10.1257/mac.20150293
+eissn: 1945-7715
+files: []
+issn: 1945-7707
+journal: AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL-MACROECONOMICS
+keywords-plus: 'LABOR-FORCE PARTICIPATION; UNILATERAL DIVORCE; ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES;
+
+  WAGE INEQUALITY; MARRIED-WOMEN; CHILD-CARE; LAWS; FERTILITY; RATES; WORK'
+language: English
+month: JUL
+number: '3'
+number-of-cited-references: '55'
+pages: 72-115
+papis_id: 6702e3d16edaa34ba7ad1749f91fad91
+ref: Fernandez2017freeleave
+times-cited: '8'
+title: Free to Leave? A Welfare Analysis of Divorce Regimes
+type: Article
+unique-id: WOS:000408152400003
+usage-count-last-180-days: '0'
+usage-count-since-2013: '5'
+volume: '9'
+web-of-science-categories: Economics
+year: '2017'