Add wos sample results library

02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/1b62395fd26b31778d60ce950c9f43f5-konstantinidis-niki/info.yaml

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+abstract: 'This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military
+
+  conscription policy and its relationship with a country''s external
+
+  security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous
+
+  and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of
+
+  either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor.
+
+  Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens''
+
+  labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy
+
+  model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments:
+
+  a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of
+
+  a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of
+
+  preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer
+
+  army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will
+
+  favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow
+
+  me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower
+
+  procurement policy, a country''s level of external threat, and its
+
+  pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more
+
+  egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military
+
+  manpower procurement mechanism.'
+affiliation: 'Konstantinidis, N (Corresponding Author), IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic
+  Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia 21, Madrid 28006, Spain.
+
+  Konstantinidis, Nikitas, IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia
+  21, Madrid 28006, Spain.'
+article-number: 0951629819895595
+author: Konstantinidis, Nikitas
+author-email: nikitas.konstantinidis@ie.edu
+author_list:
+- family: Konstantinidis
+  given: Nikitas
+da: '2023-09-28'
+doi: 10.1177/0951629819895595
+earlyaccessdate: JAN 2020
+eissn: 1460-3667
+files: []
+issn: 0951-6298
+journal: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS
+keywords: 'Military conscription; national security; public goods; income
+
+  inequality; conscription tax'
+keywords-plus: DRAFT; PARTIES; SUPPORT; MODEL; ARMY; END; WAR
+language: English
+month: APR
+number: '2'
+number-of-cited-references: '42'
+orcid-numbers: Konstantinidis, Nikitas/0000-0002-3132-1216
+pages: 312-347
+papis_id: 82b51cee0e74e584b0a1f9771f5807c0
+ref: Konstantinidis2020militaryconscription
+researcherid-numbers: 'Baltutyte, Gerda/AGH-5630-2022
+
+  Konstantinidis, Nikitas/P-6869-2016'
+times-cited: '0'
+title: 'Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing
+  link'
+type: Article
+unique-id: WOS:000510412700001
+usage-count-last-180-days: '3'
+usage-count-since-2013: '8'
+volume: '32'
+web-of-science-categories: Political Science
+year: '2020'