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02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/0dffe48d73d551d6c4431706f02aab5e-hafiz-hiba/info.yaml

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+abstract: 'Growing inequality, the decline in labor''s share of national income, and
+
+  increasing evidence of labor-market concentration and employer buyer
+
+  power are all subjects of national attention, eliciting wide-ranging
+
+  proposals for legal reform. Many proposals hinge on labor-market fixes
+
+  and empowering workers within and beyond existing work law or through
+
+  tax-and-transfer schemes. But a recent surge of interest focuses on
+
+  applying antitrust law in labor markets, or ``labor antitrust.{''''} These
+
+  proposals call for more aggressive enforcement by the Department of
+
+  Justice (DOJ) and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) as well as stronger
+
+  legal remedies for employer collusion and unlawful monopsony that
+
+  suppresses workers'' wages.
+
+  The turn to labor antitrust is driven in part by congressional gridlock
+
+  and the collapse of labor law as a dominant source of labor market
+
+  regulation, inviting regulation through other means. Labor antitrust
+
+  promises an effective attack because agency discretion and judicial
+
+  enforcement can police labor markets without substantial amendments to
+
+  existing law, bypassing the current impasse in Congress. Further, unlike
+
+  labor and employment law, labor antitrust is uniquely positioned to
+
+  challenge industry-wide wage suppression: suing multiple employers is
+
+  increasingly challenging in work law as a statutory, doctrinal, and
+
+  procedural matter.
+
+  But current labor-antitrust proposals, while fruitful, are fundamentally
+
+  limited in two ways. First, echoing a broader antitrust policy crisis,
+
+  they inherit and reinvigorate debates about the current consumer welfare
+
+  goal of antitrust. The proposals ignore that, as a theoretical and
+
+  practical matter, employers'' anticompetitive conduct in labor markets
+
+  does not necessarily harm consumers. As a result, workers''
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+  labor-antitrust challenges will face an uphill battle under current law:
+
+  when consumers are not harmed, labor antitrust can neither effectively
+
+  police employer buyer power nor fill gaps in labor market regulation
+
+  left by a retreating labor law. Second, the proposals ignore real
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+  synergies between antitrust enforcement and labor regulation that could
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+  preempt the rise of employer buyer power and contain its exercise.
+
+  This Essay analyzes the limitations of current labor-antitrust proposals
+
+  and argues for ``regulatory sharing{''''} between antitrust and labor law
+
+  to combat the adverse effects of employer buyer power. It makes three
+
+  key contributions. First, it frames the new labor antitrust as
+
+  disrupting a grand regulatory bargain, reinforced by the Chicago School,
+
+  that separated labor and antitrust regulation to resolve a perceived
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+  paradox in serving two masters: workers and consumers. The dominance of
+
+  the consumer welfare standard resolved that paradox. Second, it explains
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+  how scholarly attempts to invigorate labor antitrust fail to overcome
+
+  this paradox and ignore theoretical and doctrinal roadblocks to
+
+  maximizing both worker and consumer welfare, leaving worker-plaintiffs
+
+  vulnerable to failure. Third, it proposes a novel restructuring of labor
+
+  market regulation that integrates antitrust and labor law enforcement to
+
+  achieve coherent and effective regulation of employer buyer power. It
+
+  refocuses labor-antitrust claims on consumer welfare ends. In doing so,
+
+  it also relegates worker welfare considerations to a labor law
+
+  supplemented and fortified by the creation of substantive presumptions
+
+  and defenses triggered by labor-antitrust findings as well as labor
+
+  agency involvement in merger review.'
+affiliation: 'Hafiz, H (Corresponding Author), Boston Coll, Law Sch, Law, Newton Ctr,
+  MA 02459 USA.
+
+  Hafiz, Hiba, Boston Coll, Law Sch, Law, Newton Ctr, MA 02459 USA.'
+author: Hafiz, Hiba
+author_list:
+- family: Hafiz
+  given: Hiba
+da: '2023-09-28'
+files: []
+issn: 0041-9494
+journal: UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
+keywords-plus: LAW
+language: English
+month: MAR
+number: '2'
+number-of-cited-references: '82'
+pages: 381-411
+papis_id: 7f18de6d11270df3b96d9f843f9cc3e7
+ref: Hafiz2020laborantitrusts
+times-cited: '15'
+title: Labor Antitrust's Paradox
+type: Article
+unique-id: WOS:000517669900005
+usage-count-last-180-days: '0'
+usage-count-since-2013: '4'
+volume: '87'
+web-of-science-categories: Law
+year: '2020'