wow-inequalities/02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/5d155ca56e74148b1a11790901f61928-bisio-laura-and-car/info.yaml

abstract: 'PurposeWithin the two-tier bargaining system, the role of complementary

  collective bargaining is somewhat controversial. In this paper, the

  authors analyse collective agreements from a triple perspective:

  scanning the contents of firm-level complementary collective agreements

  (CCAs); identifying the factors that determine the probability of

  signing a CCA and analysing the relationship between the latter and firm

  performance with a focus on the role of different negotiated

  topics.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical procedure is based on 2

  main linked sources: longitudinal balance sheet data and a

  cross-sectional dataset of a representative sample of Italian firms with

  at least 15 employees, including some retrospective information. The

  innovative dataset derives from integrating multiple sources. The main

  empirical approaches include Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)

  estimations, multivariate regressions, as well as instrumental variable

  (IV) estimations to overcome simultaneity issues.FindingsWith respect to

  the probability of signing a CCA, on the firms'' side, the authors find a

  positive role of the degree of firm capitalisation and affiliation with

  an employers'' association and a negative role of family firms compared

  to non-family firms; on the workers'' side, a positive role of the

  workers'' unionisation rate and a positive but differentiated weight of

  workers'' union representations and industrial conflicts. With regard to

  firm performance, the authors'' estimates suggest that signing a CCA is

  associated with an average increase of 3\% in total factor productivity

  (TFP) and 7.8\% in labour productivity. By investigating the contents of

  the complementarity agreements, the authors show that bargaining a wider

  range of topics implies advantages that are not homogenous, benefitting

  more efficient firms. Moreover, the authors find a specific positive and

  significant role for three main interacting issues: economic incentives,

  organisation and employment.Research limitations/implicationsThe

  cross-sectional structure of the data on bargaining practices prevents

  detecting causal relationships due to either potential common driver(s)

  of both the target variables (firm performance) and bargaining practices

  (simultaneity bias) and unobservable time-invariant firm-level

  characteristics (heterogeneity bias).Practical implicationsAccording to

  the authors'' results, policymakers should operate along four fiscal

  channels to spur the efficiency of firms, via CCA. First, tax incentives

  stimulate higher firm capitalisation, as this seems to be a

  CCA-favouring factor. Second, deduction in taxable income for union

  members, which should led to higher membership rates, hence raising the

  likelihood of obtaining a CCA. Third, incentives aimed at directly

  promoting the greater diffusion of CCAs as a source of improved

  performance. Fourth, fiscal tools aimed at favouring the negotiation of

  either specific contents or ``bundles{''''} of contents, which the

  authors'' estimates show as an additional performance-enhancing tool of

  CCA practices.Originality/valueThe conceptualisation of the contents of

  CCA as organisational investments and the whole probability function of

  signing a CCA are quite innovative. Moreover, the econometric strategy

  takes account of several potential sources of bias when estimating the

  relevant coefficients at each stage, which is currently not fully

  considered in the literature.

  Finally, this is the first study to shed light on both the diverse

  outcomes associated with different negotiated topics (in terms of

  quantity and quality) and the distinction between short and medium-long

  term effects.'
affiliation: 'Bisio, L; Cardinaleschi, S (Corresponding Author), ISTAT Italian Natl
  Inst Stat, Rome, Italy.

  Leoni, R (Corresponding Author), Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy.

  Bisio, Laura; Cardinaleschi, Stefania, ISTAT Italian Natl Inst Stat, Rome, Italy.

  Leoni, Riccardo, Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy.

  Leoni, Riccardo, Interuniv Res Ctr Ezio Tarantelli, Rome, Italy.'
author: Bisio, Laura and Cardinaleschi, Stefania and Leoni, Riccardo
author-email: 'bisio@istat.it

  cardinal@istat.it

  riccardo.leoni08@gmail.com'
author_list:
- family: Bisio
  given: Laura
- family: Cardinaleschi
  given: Stefania
- family: Leoni
  given: Riccardo
da: '2023-09-28'
doi: 10.1108/IJM-06-2021-0373
earlyaccessdate: JAN 2023
eissn: 1758-6577
files: []
issn: 0143-7720
journal: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANPOWER
keywords: 'Productivity; Employee participation; Collective bargaining; Labour and

  management relations'
keywords-plus: 'LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; WORKS COUNCILS; FLEXIBLE

  PAY; WAGES; PANEL; FAMILY; REPRESENTATION; COMPETE; REFORM'
language: English
month: MAY 31
number: '4'
number-of-cited-references: '63'
orcid-numbers: Leoni, Riccardo/0000-0002-8649-3672
pages: 728-754
papis_id: 14dc28eaef2b100e9853bb91616814c6
ref: Bisio2023complementarycollect
times-cited: '0'
title: 'Complementary collective bargaining and firm performance: new evidence for
  Italian firms'
type: article
unique-id: WOS:000919414700001
usage-count-last-180-days: '5'
usage-count-since-2013: '6'
volume: '44'
web-of-science-categories: Industrial Relations \& Labor; Management
year: '2023'