wow-inequalities/02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/1b62395fd26b31778d60ce950c9f43f5-konstantinidis-niki/info.yaml

79 lines
2.6 KiB
YAML
Raw Normal View History

2023-09-28 14:46:10 +00:00
abstract: 'This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military
conscription policy and its relationship with a country''s external
security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous
and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of
either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor.
Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens''
labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy
model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments:
a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of
a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of
preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer
army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will
favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow
me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower
procurement policy, a country''s level of external threat, and its
pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more
egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military
manpower procurement mechanism.'
affiliation: 'Konstantinidis, N (Corresponding Author), IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic
Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia 21, Madrid 28006, Spain.
Konstantinidis, Nikitas, IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia
21, Madrid 28006, Spain.'
article-number: 0951629819895595
author: Konstantinidis, Nikitas
author-email: nikitas.konstantinidis@ie.edu
author_list:
- family: Konstantinidis
given: Nikitas
da: '2023-09-28'
doi: 10.1177/0951629819895595
earlyaccessdate: JAN 2020
eissn: 1460-3667
files: []
issn: 0951-6298
journal: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS
keywords: 'Military conscription; national security; public goods; income
inequality; conscription tax'
keywords-plus: DRAFT; PARTIES; SUPPORT; MODEL; ARMY; END; WAR
language: English
month: APR
number: '2'
number-of-cited-references: '42'
orcid-numbers: Konstantinidis, Nikitas/0000-0002-3132-1216
pages: 312-347
papis_id: 82b51cee0e74e584b0a1f9771f5807c0
ref: Konstantinidis2020militaryconscription
researcherid-numbers: 'Baltutyte, Gerda/AGH-5630-2022
Konstantinidis, Nikitas/P-6869-2016'
times-cited: '0'
title: 'Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing
link'
2023-10-01 08:15:07 +00:00
type: article
2023-09-28 14:46:10 +00:00
unique-id: WOS:000510412700001
usage-count-last-180-days: '3'
usage-count-since-2013: '8'
volume: '32'
web-of-science-categories: Political Science
year: '2020'