79 lines
2.6 KiB
YAML
79 lines
2.6 KiB
YAML
abstract: 'This article seeks to analyze the political economy of military
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conscription policy and its relationship with a country''s external
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security environment. National security is modeled as a non-rivalrous
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and non-excludable public good, whose production technology consists of
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either centrally conscripted or competitively recruited military labor.
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Conscription is construed as an implicit discretionary tax on citizens''
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labor endowment. Based on this, I propose a simple political economy
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model of pure public goods provision financed by two policy instruments:
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a lump-sum income tax and a conscription tax. Constraint optimization of
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a quasi-linear utility function gives rise to three general classes of
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preferences: high- and low-skilled citizens will prefer an all-volunteer
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army, albeit of different size, whereas medium-skilled citizens will
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favor positive levels of conscription. These derived preferences allow
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me to tease out an explicit relationship between military manpower
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procurement policy, a country''s level of external threat, and its
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pre-tax income inequality levels. One of my key findings is that more
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egalitarian countries are more likely to use conscription as a military
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manpower procurement mechanism.'
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affiliation: 'Konstantinidis, N (Corresponding Author), IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic
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Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia 21, Madrid 28006, Spain.
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Konstantinidis, Nikitas, IE Univ, Sch Global \& Pubic Affairs, C Pedro de Valdivia
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21, Madrid 28006, Spain.'
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article-number: 0951629819895595
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author: Konstantinidis, Nikitas
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author-email: nikitas.konstantinidis@ie.edu
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author_list:
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- family: Konstantinidis
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given: Nikitas
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da: '2023-09-28'
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doi: 10.1177/0951629819895595
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earlyaccessdate: JAN 2020
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eissn: 1460-3667
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files: []
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issn: 0951-6298
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journal: JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL POLITICS
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keywords: 'Military conscription; national security; public goods; income
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inequality; conscription tax'
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keywords-plus: DRAFT; PARTIES; SUPPORT; MODEL; ARMY; END; WAR
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language: English
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month: APR
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number: '2'
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number-of-cited-references: '42'
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orcid-numbers: Konstantinidis, Nikitas/0000-0002-3132-1216
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pages: 312-347
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papis_id: 82b51cee0e74e584b0a1f9771f5807c0
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ref: Konstantinidis2020militaryconscription
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researcherid-numbers: 'Baltutyte, Gerda/AGH-5630-2022
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Konstantinidis, Nikitas/P-6869-2016'
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times-cited: '0'
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title: 'Military conscription, external security, and income inequality: The missing
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link'
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type: article
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unique-id: WOS:000510412700001
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usage-count-last-180-days: '3'
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usage-count-since-2013: '8'
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volume: '32'
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web-of-science-categories: Political Science
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year: '2020'
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