feat(data): Add Li2022 workfare study

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3 changed files with 64 additions and 3 deletions

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@ -33013,10 +33013,10 @@ policy recc:
earlyaccessdate = {JAN 2022}, earlyaccessdate = {JAN 2022},
eissn = {1743-9140}, eissn = {1743-9140},
unique-id = {WOS:000744879800001}, unique-id = {WOS:000744879800001},
keywords = {country::India,program::public works,region::AP,relevant,sample::almp}, keywords = {country::India,done::extracted,inequality::income,region::AP,relevant,sample::almp,type::work\_programme},
note = {A study on the effects of land ownership concentration on the employment guarantee scheme (NREGS) in India, by analyzing the resulting earnings and proliferation of NREGS itself.\textbf{It looks at this concentration in more general terms as a proxy for power asymmetry between potential employers and employees.\textbf{It finds that a concentration of land ownership in a region generally decreases or impedes the proliferation of NREGS since landlords use their political power to oppose the program.\textbf{It suggests this is primarily due the potential of NREGS to impact wages which is opposed by landlords to minimize rural bargaining power.\textbf{The channel that NREGS have to affect rural earnings in this way is through a de-facto enforcement of minimum wages laws, by providing an alternative to more informal work if no minimum wages are obeyed.}}}}}, note = {A study on the effects of land ownership concentration on the employment guarantee scheme (NREGS) in India, by analyzing the resulting earnings and proliferation of NREGS itself.\textbf{It looks at this concentration in more general terms as a proxy for power asymmetry between potential employers and employees.\textbf{It finds that a concentration of land ownership in a region generally decreases or impedes the proliferation of NREGS since landlords use their political power to oppose the program.\textbf{It suggests this is primarily due the potential of NREGS to impact wages which is opposed by landlords to minimize rural bargaining power.\textbf{The channel that NREGS have to affect rural earnings in this way is through a de-facto enforcement of minimum wages laws, by providing an alternative to more informal work if no minimum wages are obeyed.}}}}},
timestamp = {2022-03-05T11:01:52Z}, timestamp = {2022-03-05T11:01:52Z},
file = {/home/marty/Zotero/storage/FN529XF4/Li2022_Land_inequality_and_workfare_policies.pdf} file = {/home/marty/Zotero/storage/3B625EDA/Li2022_Land_inequality_and_workfare_policies.pdf;/home/marty/Zotero/storage/FN529XF4/Li2022_Land_inequality_and_workfare_policies_supplementary_materials.pdf}
} }
@article{Liberati2009, @article{Liberati2009,

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@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
author: Li, Y., & Sunder, N.
year: 2022
title: Land inequality and workfare policies
publisher: Journal of development studies
uri: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.2008362
pubtype: article
discipline: development
country: India
period: 2005-2006
maxlength: 12
targeting: implicit
group: potential labour force
data: Indian Agricultural Census (2000, 2005); national administrative panel data MGNREGA public data portal
design: quasi-experimental
method: OLS, instrumental variable approach
sample: 414
unit: district
representativeness: national
causal: 1 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
theory: political capture theory
limitations: sample attrition in matching NREGA districts to GINI data; assumption of no institutional/cultural unobservables
observation:
- intervention: work programme
institutional: 0
structural: 1
agency: 0
inequality: income, spatial
type: 0 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
measures: employment (LFP rate per land ownership through Gini)
findings: work programme generally increases LFP; but internal heterogeneity, difference in job provision not due to public job demand changes, caste, religion; previous capital inequality (land ownership) strongly affects programme efficacy
channels: landlords oppose implementation due to general wage increases following, lobby against workfare introduction; decreased bargaining power of labour in more inequal districts
direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
significance: 2 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
notes:
annotation: |
A study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
The study finds that there is significantly negative relationship between the Gini coefficient and the provision of jobs through the work programme.
In other words, the workfare policy implemented at least in part to reduce a district's inequality seems to be less effective if there is a larger prior capital inequality.
The authors see the primary channel to be the landlords' opposition to broad workfare programme introduction since they are often followed by overall wage increases in the districts.
They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.

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@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ It suggests that, aside from a less entrenched trade unionisation in the country
Employers were restricted in their ability to effectively conduct lobbying, and made more vulnerable to what the authors suggest are 'divide-and-conquer' strategies by government with a strongly entrenched trade unionisation, due to being more separate and uncoordinated. Employers were restricted in their ability to effectively conduct lobbying, and made more vulnerable to what the authors suggest are 'divide-and-conquer' strategies by government with a strongly entrenched trade unionisation, due to being more separate and uncoordinated.
A limit is the strong institutional context of the two countries which makes generalizable application of its underlying channels more difficult to the overarching quantitative analysis of inequality outcomes. A limit is the strong institutional context of the two countries which makes generalizable application of its underlying channels more difficult to the overarching quantitative analysis of inequality outcomes.
### Active labour market policies ### Workfare programmes
@Whitworth2021 analyse the spatial consequences of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases. @Whitworth2021 analyse the spatial consequences of a UK work programme on spatial factors of job deprivation or opportunity increases.
The programme follows a quasi-marketized approach of rewarding employment-favourable results of transitions into employment and further sustained months in employment. The programme follows a quasi-marketized approach of rewarding employment-favourable results of transitions into employment and further sustained months in employment.
@ -768,6 +768,17 @@ the study shows that already job-deprived areas indeed experience further depriv
while non-deprived areas are correlated with positive impacts, thereby further deteriorating spatial inequality outcomes. while non-deprived areas are correlated with positive impacts, thereby further deteriorating spatial inequality outcomes.
This occurs because of providers in the programme de-prioritizing the already deprived areas ('parking') in favour prioritizing wealthier areas for improved within-programme results. This occurs because of providers in the programme de-prioritizing the already deprived areas ('parking') in favour prioritizing wealthier areas for improved within-programme results.
A study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
The study finds that there is significantly negative relationship between the Gini coefficient and the provision of jobs through the work programme.
In other words, the workfare policy implemented at least in part to reduce a district's inequality seems to be less effective if there is a larger prior capital inequality.
The authors see the primary channel to be the landlords' opposition to broad workfare programme introduction since they are often followed by overall wage increases in the districts.
They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
### Social protection ### Social protection
<!-- TODO Include part of Pi2016 on social security --> <!-- TODO Include part of Pi2016 on social security -->