fix(data): Fix wrong data entries, improve wording
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6 changed files with 21 additions and 21 deletions
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ observation:
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type: # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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type: # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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indicator: # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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indicator: # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: political power
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measures: political power
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findings: more unequal distribution of
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findings: more unequal political power distribution hinders processes of collective organisation
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channels:
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channels:
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direction: # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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direction: # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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author: Alexiou, C., & Trachanas, E.
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author: Alexiou, C., & Trachanas, E.
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year: 2023
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year: 2023
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title: "The impact of trade unions and government party orientation on income inequality: Evidence from 17 OECD economies"
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title: "The impact of trade unions and government party orientation on income inequality: Evidence from 17 OECD economies"
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publisher: Journal of Economic Studies
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publisher: Journal of Economic Studies
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ observation:
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type: # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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type: # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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indicator: # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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indicator: # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: Gini coeff
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measures: Gini coeff
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findings: unionization strongly related with decreasing income inequalityi; right-wing institutional contexts related with increased income inequality
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findings: unionization strongly related with decreasing income inequality; right-wing institutional contexts related with increased income inequality
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channels: redistribution of political power under unions; weak unionization increases post-redistribution inequality
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channels: redistribution of political power under unions; weak unionization increases post-redistribution inequality
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direction: # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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direction: # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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@ -40,6 +40,6 @@ notes: PRELIMINARY EXTRACTION
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annotation: |
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annotation: |
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A study on the effects of both political orientation of governments' parties and a country's trade unionization on its income inequality.
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A study on the effects of both political orientation of governments' parties and a country's trade unionization on its income inequality.
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It finds that, generally, strong unionization is strongly related to decreasing income inequality, most likely through a redistribution of political power through collective mobilization in national contexts of stronger unions.
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It finds that, generally, strong unionization is strongly related to decreasing income inequality, most likely through a redistribution of political power through collective mobilization in national contexts of stronger unions.
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It also suggests that in contexts of weaker unionization, post-redistribution income inequality is higher, thus also fostering unequal redistributive policies.
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It also suggests that in contexts of weaker unionization, post-redistribution income inequality is higher, thus also fostering unequal redistributive policies.
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Lastly, it finds positive relations between right-wing orientation of a country's government and its income inequality, with more mixed results for centrist governments pointing to potential fragmentations in their redistributive policy approaches.
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Lastly, it finds positive relations between right-wing orientation of a country's government and its income inequality, with more mixed results for centrist governments pointing to potential fragmentations in their redistributive policy approaches.
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The study is mostly limited in not being able to account for individual drivers (or barriers) and can thus not disaggregate for the effects for example arbitration or collective bargaining.
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The study is mostly limited in not being able to account for individual drivers (or barriers) and can thus not disaggregate for the effects for example arbitration or collective bargaining.
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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author: Ferguson, J.-P.
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author: Ferguson, J.-P.
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year: 2015
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year: 2015
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title: "The control of managerial discretion: Evidence from unionization’s impact on employment segregation"
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title: "The control of managerial discretion: Evidence from unionization’s impact on employment segregation"
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publisher: American Journal of Sociology
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publisher: American Journal of Sociology
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@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ method:
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sample:
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sample:
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unit:
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unit:
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representativeness:
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representativeness:
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causal: 1 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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causal: 0 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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theory:
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theory:
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limitations: most of effects may be caused by unsobservables
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limitations: most of effects may be caused by unsobservables
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observation:
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observation:
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- intervention: collective action (unionization)
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- intervention: collective action (unionization)
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@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ observation:
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type: 1 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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type: 1 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: employment
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measures: employment
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findings: stronger unionization associated with more women and minorities in management, marginally significant
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findings: stronger unionization associated with more women and minorities in management, but only marginally significant
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channels: possible self-selection into unionization
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channels: possible self-selection into unionization
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: 1 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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significance: 1 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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@ -40,6 +40,6 @@ notes: PRELIMINARY EXTRACTION;
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annotation: |
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annotation: |
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A study on the effects of a more unionized workforce in the United States, on the representation of women and minorities in the management of enterprises.
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A study on the effects of a more unionized workforce in the United States, on the representation of women and minorities in the management of enterprises.
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It finds that while stronger unionization is associated both with more women and more minorities represented in the overall workforce and in management, this effect is only marginally significant.
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It finds that while stronger unionization is associated both with more women and more minorities represented in the overall workforce and in management, this effect is only marginally significant.
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Additionally, there are drivers which may be based on unobservables and not a direct effect ---
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Additionally, there are drivers which may be based on unobservables and not a direct effect ---
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it may be a selection effect of more unionized enterprises.
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it may be a selection effect of more unionized enterprises.
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It uses union elections as its base of analysis, and thus can not exclude self-selection effects of people joining more heavily unionized enterprises rather than unionization increasing representation in its conclusions.
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It uses union elections as its base of analysis, and thus can not exclude self-selection effects of people joining more heavily unionized enterprises rather than unionization increasing representation in its conclusions.
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@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ method: general equilibrium model, microeconometric simulation model
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sample: 30000
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sample: 30000
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unit: household
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unit: household
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representativeness: national
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representativeness: national
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causal: 1 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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causal: 0 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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theory: human capital theory
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theory: human capital theory
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limitations: analytical household-level limitations; no indirect cost-effects able to be accounted for; static model
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limitations: analytical household-level limitations; no indirect cost-effects able to be accounted for; static model
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ observation:
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direction: -1
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direction: -1
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significance: 2
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significance: 2
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notes: study attempts to explictly account for spillover effects
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notes: study attempts to explictly account for spillover effects and capture conditionality for school attendance
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annotation: |
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annotation: |
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A study looking at the impact of the cash transfer programme Oportunidades in Mexico, conditioned on a household's children school attendance, on income inequality among others.
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A study looking at the impact of the cash transfer programme Oportunidades in Mexico, conditioned on a household's children school attendance, on income inequality among others.
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It finds that a combination of effects raises the average income of the poorest households by 23 percent.
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It finds that a combination of effects raises the average income of the poorest households by 23 percent.
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@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
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author: Li, Y., & Sunder, N.
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author: Li, Y., & Sunder, N.
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year: 2022
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year: 2022
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title: Land inequality and workfare policies
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title: Land inequality and workfare policies
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publisher: Journal of development studies
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publisher: Journal of development studies
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@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ observation:
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: 2 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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significance: 2 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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notes:
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notes:
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annotation: |
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annotation: |
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A study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
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A study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
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It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
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It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
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@ -46,5 +46,5 @@ annotation: |
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They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
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They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
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in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
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in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
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The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
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The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.
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[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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[^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.
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author: Wang, J., & Van Vliet, O.
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author: Wang, J., & Van Vliet, O.
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year: 2016
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year: 2016
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title: "Social Assistance and Minimum Income Benefits: Benefit Levels, Replacement Rates and Policies Across 26 Oecd Countries, 1990-2009"
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title: "Social Assistance and Minimum Income Benefits: Benefit Levels, Replacement Rates and Policies Across 26 Oecd Countries, 1990-2009"
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publisher: European Journal of Social Security
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publisher: European Journal of Social Security
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@ -8,10 +8,10 @@ discipline: economics
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country: global
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country: global
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period: 1990-2009
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period: 1990-2009
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maxlength:
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maxlength:
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targeting: implicit
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targeting: implicit
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group: low-income
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group: low-income
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data: World Bank CPI indicators; Penn World Table
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data: World Bank CPI indicators & Penn World Table; Social Assistance and Minimum Income Protection Dataset (Nelson, 2013)
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design: observational
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design: observational
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method: cross-country comparative analysis
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method: cross-country comparative analysis
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ representativeness: national
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causal: 0 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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causal: 0 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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theory:
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theory:
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limitations: data availability necessitated indicator construction for real minimum benefits and replacement rates
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limitations: some effects may stem from exchange rate/PPP changes instead
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observation:
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observation:
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- intervention: direct transfer (social assistance)
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- intervention: direct transfer (social assistance)
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institutional: 1
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institutional: 1
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indicator: 1 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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indicator: 1 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: real wage; replacement rate
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measures: real wage; replacement rate
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findings: real benefit levels increased in most countries, benefit levels increasing more than consumer prices; income replacement rates mixed outcomes with decreases in some countries where real benefit levels increased
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findings: real benefit levels increased in most countries, benefit levels increasing more than consumer prices; income replacement rates mixed outcomes with decreases in some countries where real benefit levels increased
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channels: bulk of increases comes from deliberate policy changes; benefit levels not linked to wages and policy changes not taking into account changes in wages
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channels: bulk of increases comes from deliberate policy changes; but benefit levels not linked to wages and policy changes not taking into account changes in wages
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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notes:
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notes: due to data availability indicator for real minimum benefits and replacement rates could be constructed for 26 OECD countries
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annotation: |
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annotation: |
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An observational study on the levels of social assistance benefits and wages in a national comparative study within 26 developed countries.
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An observational study on the levels of social assistance benefits and wages in a national comparative study within 26 OECD countries.
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It finds that real minimum income benefit levels generally increased in most countries from 1990 to 2009, with only a few countries, mostly in Eastern European welfare states, showing decreases during the time frame.
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It finds that real minimum income benefit levels generally increased in most countries from 1990 to 2009, with only a few countries, mostly in Eastern European welfare states, showing decreases during the time frame.
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The majority of changes in real benefit levels are from deliberate policy changes and the study calculates them by a comparison of the changes in benefit levels to the changes in consumer prices.
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The majority of changes in real benefit levels are from deliberate policy changes and the study calculates them by a comparison of the changes in benefit levels to the changes in consumer prices.
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Secondly, it finds that changes for income replacement rates are more mixed, with rates decreasing even in some countries which have increasing real benefits levels.
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Secondly, it finds that changes for income replacement rates are more mixed, with rates decreasing even in some countries which have increasing real benefits levels.
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