A study on the effects of unequal distributions of political power on the extent and provision of collective labour rights.
It is a combination of quantitative global comparison with qualitative case studies for Argentina and Chile.
It finds that, for societies in which power is more unequally distributed, collective bargaining possibilities are more limited and weaker.
It suggests that, aside from a less entrenched trade unionization in the country, the primary channel for the its weakening are that existing collective labour rights are often either restricted or disregarded outright.
Employers were restricted in their ability to effectively conduct lobbying, and made more vulnerable to what the authors suggest are 'divide-and-conquer' strategies by government with a strongly entrenched trade unionization, due to being more separate and uncoordinated.
A limit is the strong institutional context of the two countries which makes generalizable application of its underlying channels more difficult to the overarching quantitative analysis of inequality outcomes.
