61 lines
3.6 KiB
YAML
61 lines
3.6 KiB
YAML
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author: Mun, E., & Jung, J.
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year: 2018
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title: "Policy generosity, employer heterogeneity, and women’s employment opportunities: The welfare state paradox reexamined"
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publisher: American Sociological Review
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uri: https://doi.org/10.1177/0003122418772857
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pubtype: article
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discipline: sociology
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country: Japan
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period: 1992-2009
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maxlength: 84
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targeting: explicit
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group: working mothers
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data: Japan Company Handbook for Job Searchers
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design: quasi-experimental
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method:
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sample: 600
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unit: enterprise
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representativeness: national
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causal: 0 # 0 correlation / 1 causal
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theory: welfare state paradox (over-representation of women in low-authority jobs in progressive welfare states)
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limitations: limited generalizability with unique Japanese LM institutional features; limited ability to explain voluntary effects as lasting or as symbolic compliance and impression management
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observation:
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- intervention: paid leave (childcare)
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institutional: 1
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structural: 0
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agency: 0
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inequality: gender
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type: 1 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: job quality
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findings: no change for promotions for firms not previously providing leave, positive promotion impact for firms already providing leave; incentive-based policies may lead to larger effects
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channels: voluntary compliance to maintain positive reputations
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direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: 1 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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- intervention: paid leave (childcare)
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institutional: 1
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structural: 0
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agency: 0
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inequality: gender
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type: 1 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
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indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
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measures: employment
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findings: no increase in hiring discrimination against women reflected as decreased employment probability
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channels: decreases may be due to supply-side mechanisms based on individual career planning and reinforced existing gender division of household labour
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direction: 0 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
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significance: 0 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg
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notes:
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annotation: |
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A study on the effects of introductions of a variety of maternity leave laws in Japan on the employment numbers and job quality of women.
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Contrary to notions of demand-side mechanisms of the welfare state paradox, with women being less represented in high-authority employment positions due to hiring or workplace discrimination against them with increased maternity benefits,
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it finds that this is not the case for the Japanese labour market between 1992 and 2009.
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There were no increases in hiring discrimination against women, and either no significant change in promotions for firms not providing paid leave before the laws or instead a positive impact on promotions for firms that already provided paid leave.
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The authors suggest the additional promotions were primarily based on voluntary compliance of firms in order to maintain positive reputations, signaled through a larger positive response to incentive-based laws than for mandate-based ones.
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Additionally, the authors make the conjecture that the welfare paradox may rather be due to supply-side mechanisms, based on individual career planning, as well as reinforced along existing gender divisions of household labour which may increase alongside the laws.
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Limitations of the study include foremost its limited generalizability due to the unique Japanese institutional labour market structure (with many employments, for example, being within a single firm until retirement), as well as no ability yet to measure the true causes and effects of adhering to the voluntary incentive-based labour policies, with lasting effects or done as symbolic compliance efforts and mere impression management.
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