Fix poverty levels to absolute
Incorrectly used relative poverty levels for section bullet point breakdowns when this was the wrong measures (mix of relative inequality and absolute poverty).
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3 changed files with 7 additions and 5 deletions
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
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* A stable and increasing real GDP growth rates but slow decrease in relative poverty levels.
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* A stable and increasing real GDP growth rates but slow decrease in poverty levels.
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* Poverty affects households in poorly educated households in rural areas to much higher levels than urban areas.
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* Poverty affects households in poorly educated households in rural areas to much higher levels than urban areas.
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* Education disparities happen mainly along community-level dimensions through high socio-economic segregation of schools and different access to resources.
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* Education disparities happen mainly along community-level dimensions through high socio-economic segregation of schools and different access to resources.
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* Large disparity of access to electricity between urban and rural households, which directly negatively affects the environmental conditions of individual rural households.
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* Large disparity of access to electricity between urban and rural households, which directly negatively affects the environmental conditions of individual rural households.
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@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ Its growth rate averaged 6.4% for the years 2017 to 2019 and, with a decrease du
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There only exists sporadic and fluctuating data on the country's overall inequality, with the World Bank Development Index noting a Gini coefficient of 38.6 for the year (2003) before rising to 43.4 (2011) and up to 47.8 (2015),
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There only exists sporadic and fluctuating data on the country's overall inequality, with the World Bank Development Index noting a Gini coefficient of 38.6 for the year (2003) before rising to 43.4 (2011) and up to 47.8 (2015),
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though decreasing below the 2003 level to 37.8 (2018) in its most recent calculation, see @fig-ben.
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though decreasing below the 2003 level to 37.8 (2018) in its most recent calculation, see @fig-ben.
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At the same time, the country's poverty rate, even measured based on the international line, only decreased at a very slow rate in its most recent years,
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At the same time, the country's poverty rate, even measured based on the international line, only decreased at a very slow rate in its most recent years,
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from a relative rate of households in poverty at 18.8% in 2019, to 18.7% in 2020 and 18.3% at the end of 2021,
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from a share of households in poverty at 18.8% in 2019, to 18.7% in 2020 and 18.3% at the end of 2021,
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with the reduction threatened to be slowed further through increased prices on food and energy [@WorldBank2022b].
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with the reduction threatened to be slowed further through increased prices on food and energy [@WorldBank2022b].
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```{python}
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```{python}
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* Poverty and inequality in Uganda are at a fluctuating level in Uganda, with relative poverty staying roughly stable and inequality slowly trending upward.
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* Poverty and inequality in Uganda are at a fluctuating level in Uganda, with poverty levels staying roughly stable and inequality slowly trending upward.
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* National poverty line set very low, potentially hiding additional households in states of deprivation and those in danger of reverting to poverty.
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* National poverty line set very low, potentially hiding additional households in states of deprivation and those in danger of reverting to poverty.
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* Inequality, poverty and informal economy in close circular relation in Uganda, presenting a vicious circle for those captive within.
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* Inequality, poverty and informal economy in close circular relation in Uganda, presenting a vicious circle for those captive within.
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* Education levels of poor people are consistently low, with those of rural population more so.
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* Education levels of poor people are consistently low, with those of rural population more so.
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@ -143,8 +143,10 @@ Hudson et al. [-@Hudson2021] along the same dimension find that,
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while the set of relevant variables is largely similar with age, social capital, internal and external support after the flood and the perceived severity of previous flood impacts having major impacts,
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while the set of relevant variables is largely similar with age, social capital, internal and external support after the flood and the perceived severity of previous flood impacts having major impacts,
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women tend to show longer recovery times and psychological variables can influence recovery rates more than some adverse flood impacts.
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women tend to show longer recovery times and psychological variables can influence recovery rates more than some adverse flood impacts.
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While the quantitative evidence for impacts of such shock events are relatively sparse, Jafino et al. [-@Jafino2021] lament the overuse of aggregate perspectives, instead disaggregating the local and inter-sectoral effects to find out that flood protection efforts in the Mekong Delta often predominantly support large-scale farming while small-scale farmers can be harmed through them.
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While the quantitative evidence for impacts of such shock events are relatively sparse, Jafino et al. [-@Jafino2021] lament the overuse of aggregate perspectives,
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They find that measures decrease the aggregate total output and equity indicators by disaggregating profitability indicators into inundation, sedimentation, soil fertility, nutrient dynamics, behavioral land-use in an assessment which sees within-sector policy responses often having an effect on adjacent sectors, increasing the inter-district Gini coefficient.
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instead disaggregating the local and inter-sectoral effects to find out that flood protection efforts in the Mekong Delta often predominantly support large-scale farming while small-scale farmers can be harmed through them.
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They find that measures decrease the aggregate total output and equity indicators by disaggregating profitability indicators into inundation, sedimentation, soil fertility, nutrient dynamics and behavioral land-use in an assessment which sees within-sector policy responses often having an effect on adjacent sectors,
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increasing the inter-district Gini coefficient.
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Adaptation during these catastrophic events reinforces the asset and endowment drivers of non-shock event times,
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Adaptation during these catastrophic events reinforces the asset and endowment drivers of non-shock event times,
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with impacts levels often depending on access to non-farm income sources, access to further arable land, knowledge of adaptive farming practices and mitigation of possible health risks such as water contamination [@Son2020].
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with impacts levels often depending on access to non-farm income sources, access to further arable land, knowledge of adaptive farming practices and mitigation of possible health risks such as water contamination [@Son2020].
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Karpouzoglou et al. [-@Karpouzoglou2019] make the point that, ultimately, the pure coupling of flood resilience into infrastructural or institutional interventions needs to take care not to amplify existing inequalities through unforeseen consequences ('ripple effects') which can't be escaped by vulnerable people due to their existing immobility.
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Karpouzoglou et al. [-@Karpouzoglou2019] make the point that, ultimately, the pure coupling of flood resilience into infrastructural or institutional interventions needs to take care not to amplify existing inequalities through unforeseen consequences ('ripple effects') which can't be escaped by vulnerable people due to their existing immobility.
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