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<p>Vietnam’s economy is now firmly in the third decade of ongoing economic reform (<em>Doi Moi</em>) as a market-based economy, which lead to remarkable growth phases through opening the economy to international trade while, seen over the bulk of its population, attempting to keep inequality rates managed through policies of controlling credit and reducing subsidies to state-owned enterprises <span class="citation" data-cites="Bui2019">(<a href="#ref-Bui2019" role="doc-biblioref">Bui &amp; Imai, 2019</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Vietnam’s economy is now firmly in the third decade of ongoing economic reform (<em>Doi Moi</em>) as a market-based economy, which lead to remarkable growth phases through opening the economy to international trade while, seen over the bulk of its population, attempting to keep inequality rates managed through policies of controlling credit and reducing subsidies to state-owned enterprises <span class="citation" data-cites="Bui2019">(<a href="#ref-Bui2019" role="doc-biblioref">Bui &amp; Imai, 2019</a>)</span>.</p>
<!-- poor/poverty <40%; mention low social mobility: different social insurances [@Bui2019] --> <!-- poor/poverty <40%; mention low social mobility: different social insurances [@Bui2019] -->
<p>Poverty in Vietnam is marked by a drastic reduction in absolute terms over this time with some of the decline directly attributable to the liberalization of markets over the country’s growth more generally <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2012 McCaig2011 Le2022">(<a href="#ref-Le2022" role="doc-biblioref">N. V. T. Le et al., 2022</a>; <a href="#ref-McCaig2011" role="doc-biblioref">McCaig, 2011</a>; <a href="#ref-WorldBank2012" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2012</a>)</span>. While the rate of decline slowed since the mid-2000s <span class="citation" data-cites="VASS2006 VASS2011">(<a href="#ref-VASS2006" role="doc-biblioref">VASS, 2006</a>, <a href="#ref-VASS2011" role="doc-biblioref">2011</a>)</span>, it continued declining in tandem with small income inequality decreases. The overall income inequality decrease that Vietnam experienced from the early 2000s suggests that economic growth has been accompanied by equity extending beyond poverty reduction <span class="citation" data-cites="Benjamin2017">(<a href="#ref-Benjamin2017" role="doc-biblioref">Benjamin et al., 2017</a>)</span>. On the other hand, Le et al. <span class="citation" data-cites="Le2021">(<a href="#ref-Le2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021</a>)</span> suggest a slight increase in overall income distribution from 2010-2018. At the same time, the population groups most affected by poverty through welfare inequalities stay unaltered, as do largely the primary factors accompanying it: There is severe poverty persistence among ethnic minorities in Vietnam <span class="citation" data-cites="Baulch2012">(<a href="#ref-Baulch2012" role="doc-biblioref">Baulch et al., 2012</a>)</span>, concomitant with low education and skills, more prevalent dependency on subsistence agriculture, physical and social isolation, specific disadvantages which become linked to ethnic identities and a greater exposure to natural disasters and risks <span class="citation" data-cites="Kozel2014">(<a href="#ref-Kozel2014" role="doc-biblioref">Kozel, 2014</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Poverty in Vietnam is marked by a drastic reduction in absolute terms over this time with some of the decline directly attributable to the liberalization of markets over the country’s growth more generally <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2012 McCaig2011 Le2022">(<a href="#ref-Le2022" role="doc-biblioref">N. V. T. Le et al., 2022</a>; <a href="#ref-McCaig2011" role="doc-biblioref">McCaig, 2011</a>; <a href="#ref-WorldBank2012" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2012</a>)</span>. While the rate of decline slowed since the mid-2000s <span class="citation" data-cites="VASS2006 VASS2011">(<a href="#ref-VASS2006" role="doc-biblioref">VASS, 2006</a>, <a href="#ref-VASS2011" role="doc-biblioref">2011</a>)</span>, it continued declining in tandem with small income inequality decreases. The overall income inequality decrease that Vietnam experienced from the early 2000s suggests that economic growth has been accompanied by equity extending beyond poverty reduction <span class="citation" data-cites="Benjamin2017">(<a href="#ref-Benjamin2017" role="doc-biblioref">Benjamin et al., 2017</a>)</span>. On the other hand, Le et al. <span class="citation" data-cites="Le2021">(<a href="#ref-Le2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021</a>)</span> suggest a slight increase in overall income distribution from 2010-2018. At the same time, the population groups most affected by poverty through welfare inequalities stay unaltered, as do largely the primary factors accompanying it: There is severe poverty persistence among ethnic minorities in Vietnam <span class="citation" data-cites="Baulch2012">(<a href="#ref-Baulch2012" role="doc-biblioref">Baulch et al., 2012</a>)</span>, concomitant with low education and skills, more prevalent dependency on subsistence agriculture, physical and social isolation, specific disadvantages which become linked to ethnic identities and a greater exposure to natural disasters and risks <span class="citation" data-cites="Kozel2014">(<a href="#ref-Kozel2014" role="doc-biblioref">Kozel, 2014</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>The country’s overall estimated Gini coefficient for income fluctuates between 0.42 and 0.44 between 2010 and 2018, with the highest levels of income inequality observed in the Central Highlands in 2016, though absolute income may be rising, with the top quintile having 9.2 times the income of the lowest quintile in 2010 and 9.8 times in 2016 <span class="citation" data-cites="Le2021">(<a href="#ref-Le2021" role="doc-biblioref">Q. H. Le et al., 2021</a>)</span>. For Gini coefficients estimated using consumption per capita, see <a href="#fig-vnm">Figure 1</a>, which shows similar trends of increasing inequality, with 2010 constituting a significant increase. Economic inequality and poverty in Vietnam thus underlies an intersectional focus, between ethnic minorities, regional disparities, rural-urban divides and gendered lines, one which exogenous shocks can rapidly exacerbate as the example of the COVID-19 pandemic has recently shown <span class="citation" data-cites="Ebrahim2021">(<a href="#ref-Ebrahim2021" role="doc-biblioref">Ebrahim et al., 2021</a>)</span>.</p> <p>The country’s overall estimated Gini coefficient for income fluctuates between 0.42 and 0.44 between 2010 and 2018, with the highest levels of income inequality observed in the Central Highlands in 2016, though absolute income may be rising, with the top quintile having 9.2 times the income of the lowest quintile in 2010 and 9.8 times in 2016 <span class="citation" data-cites="Le2021">(<a href="#ref-Le2021" role="doc-biblioref">Q. H. Le et al., 2021</a>)</span>. On the other hand, the bottom 40% experienced a slight absolute rise in mean income per capita from 4.00 USD (2011 PPP) in 2014 to 5.00 USD (2011 PPP) in 2018 <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022e">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022e" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>. For Gini coefficients estimated using consumption per capita, see <a href="#fig-vnm">Figure 1</a>, which shows similar trends of increasing inequality, with 2010 constituting a significant increase. Economic inequality and poverty in Vietnam thus underlies an intersectional focus, between ethnic minorities, regional disparities, rural-urban divides and gendered lines, one which exogenous shocks can rapidly exacerbate as the example of the COVID-19 pandemic has recently shown <span class="citation" data-cites="Ebrahim2021">(<a href="#ref-Ebrahim2021" role="doc-biblioref">Ebrahim et al., 2021</a>)</span>.</p>
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<p>Uganda generally has a degree of inequality that fluctuates but over time seems largely unchanged, as does the share of people below its poverty line in recent years. The long-term level of income inequality in the country stayed relatively stagnant, with a Gini coefficient for the consumption per capita of 0.36 calculated for the 1992/93 census and a World Bank calculation of 0.43 for the year 2019, with the coefficient rising slighly in the years 2002/03 and 2009/10 during its fluctuation <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>, see also <a href="#fig-uga" role="doc-biblioref">Figure 4</a>)</span>, while <span class="citation" data-cites="Lwanga-Ntale2014">Lwanga-Ntale (<a href="#ref-Lwanga-Ntale2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finds a slight upward trend over time. However, the aggregation masks several important distinctions: Rural inequality overall is lower than urban inequality, with <span class="citation" data-cites="Lwanga-Ntale2014">Lwanga-Ntale (<a href="#ref-Lwanga-Ntale2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finding Gini coefficients of 0.35 and 0.41 for 2012/13 respectively. Additionally, he sees inequalities between income quintiles primarily driven by the highest (0.25) and lowest (0.14) quintiles, whereas middle-income show lower Gini coefficients (0.05-0.07). These inequality levels remained mostly unchanged between 2012/13 and 2019/20 but hide qualitative dimensions such as the shift out of a lower-income agricultural livelihood predominantly taking place among older men who have at least some level of formal education and are from already more well-off households <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Uganda generally has a degree of inequality that fluctuates but over time seems largely unchanged, as does the share of people below its poverty line in recent years. The long-term level of income inequality in the country stayed relatively stagnant, with a Gini coefficient for the consumption per capita of 0.36 calculated for the 1992/93 census and a World Bank calculation of 0.43 for the year 2019, with the coefficient rising slighly in the years 2002/03 and 2009/10 during its fluctuation <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022h</a>, see also <a href="#fig-uga" role="doc-biblioref">Figure 4</a>)</span>, while <span class="citation" data-cites="Lwanga-Ntale2014">Lwanga-Ntale (<a href="#ref-Lwanga-Ntale2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finds a slight upward trend over time. However, the aggregation masks several important distinctions: Rural inequality overall is lower than urban inequality, with <span class="citation" data-cites="Lwanga-Ntale2014">Lwanga-Ntale (<a href="#ref-Lwanga-Ntale2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finding Gini coefficients of 0.35 and 0.41 for 2012/13 respectively. Additionally, he sees inequalities between income quintiles primarily driven by the highest (0.25) and lowest (0.14) quintiles, whereas middle-income show lower Gini coefficients (0.05-0.07). These inequality levels remained mostly unchanged between 2012/13 and 2019/20 but hide qualitative dimensions such as the shift out of a lower-income agricultural livelihood predominantly taking place among older men who have at least some level of formal education and are from already more well-off households <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022h</a>)</span>.</p>
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<p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p> <p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p>
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<!-- poverty --> <!-- poverty -->
<p>The World Bank <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022f</a>)</span> report goes on to examine the share of people below the poverty line in Uganda: around 30% of households are in a state of poverty in 2019/20, which once again fluctuated but roughly reflects the share of 30.7% households in poverty in 2012/13. Two surges in rural household poverty in 2012/2013 and 2016/17 can be linked to droughts in the country, with an improvement in 2019/20 conversely being linked to favorable weather conditions. <!-- TODO find citation or put Atamanov --> <span class="citation" data-cites="Ssewanyana2012">Ssewanyana &amp; Kasirye (<a href="#ref-Ssewanyana2012" role="doc-biblioref">2012</a>)</span> find that in absolute terms poverty fell significantly (from 28.5% in 2005/06 to 23.9% in 2009/10) but there are clear relative regional differences emerging, with Western Ugandan households increasing in poverty while Northern and Eastern households reduced their share of households below the poverty line. Additionally, they find that while transient poverty is more common than chronic poverty in Uganda, nearly 10% of households continue to live in persistent material deprivation.</p> <p>The World Bank <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022h</a>)</span> report goes on to examine the share of people below the poverty line in Uganda: around 30% of households are in a state of poverty in 2019/20, which once again fluctuated but roughly reflects the share of 30.7% households in poverty in 2012/13. Two surges in rural household poverty in 2012/2013 and 2016/17 can be linked to droughts in the country, with an improvement in 2019/20 conversely being linked to favorable weather conditions. <!-- TODO find citation or put Atamanov --> <span class="citation" data-cites="Ssewanyana2012">Ssewanyana &amp; Kasirye (<a href="#ref-Ssewanyana2012" role="doc-biblioref">2012</a>)</span> find that in absolute terms poverty fell significantly (from 28.5% in 2005/06 to 23.9% in 2009/10) but there are clear relative regional differences emerging, with Western Ugandan households increasing in poverty while Northern and Eastern households reduced their share of households below the poverty line. Additionally, they find that while transient poverty is more common than chronic poverty in Uganda, nearly 10% of households continue to live in persistent material deprivation.</p>
<p>Lastly, for a long time it has been seen as an issue that Uganda puts its national poverty line too low with the line being put between 0.94 USD PPP and 1.07 USD PPP depending on the province (lower than the international live of 1.90 USD PPP), while <span class="citation" data-cites="vandeVen2021">van de Ven et al. (<a href="#ref-vandeVen2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021</a>)</span> estimate a living income of around 3.82 USD PPP would be required for a national poverty line that meets basic human rights for a decent living. <!-- TODO find a source for the national poverty line being too low (quant data is already in vandeVen2021) --></p> <p>Lastly, for a long time it has been seen as an issue that Uganda puts its national poverty line too low with the line being put between 0.94 USD (2011 PPP) and 1.07 USD (2011 PPP) depending on the province (lower than the international live of 1.90 USD PPP), while <span class="citation" data-cites="vandeVen2021">van de Ven et al. (<a href="#ref-vandeVen2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021</a>)</span> estimate a living income of around 3.82 USD (2011 PPP) would be required for a national poverty line that meets basic human rights for a decent living. In absolute terms, the bottom 40% of Uganda had a median daily income of 1.28 USD (2011 PPP) in 2016 which kept stable to 2019 <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022e">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022e" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>.</p>
<!-- endowment/assets: education, ..? --> <!-- endowment/assets: education, ..? -->
<p>Esaku <span class="citation" data-cites="Esaku2021 Esaku2021a">(<a href="#ref-Esaku2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021b</a>, <a href="#ref-Esaku2021a" role="doc-biblioref">2021a</a>)</span> finds a somewhat circular driving relationship between Ugandan inequality, poverty and working in what calls the shadow economy: inequality increases the size of the informal economy, as a large subsistence sector creates revenue tax shortfalls, undermines the governments efforts to attain equitable income distributions in the economy and the creation of social safety nets for the poort, who, in turn, have to turn to the informal economy to secure their livelihoods, increasing its size both short- and long-term and feeding back into the cycle.</p> <p>Esaku <span class="citation" data-cites="Esaku2021 Esaku2021a">(<a href="#ref-Esaku2021" role="doc-biblioref">2021b</a>, <a href="#ref-Esaku2021a" role="doc-biblioref">2021a</a>)</span> finds a somewhat circular driving relationship between Ugandan inequality, poverty and working in what calls the shadow economy: inequality increases the size of the informal economy, as a large subsistence sector creates revenue tax shortfalls, undermines the governments efforts to attain equitable income distributions in the economy and the creation of social safety nets for the poort, who, in turn, have to turn to the informal economy to secure their livelihoods, increasing its size both short- and long-term and feeding back into the cycle.</p>
<p><span class="citation" data-cites="Cali2014">Cali (<a href="#ref-Cali2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finds that, already, one of the primary determinants of income disparity in more trade-exposed markets of Uganda in the 1990s were the increasing education differences leading to more disparate wage premiums. Additionally, slow structural change — further impeded by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which pushed both urban and rural residents back into poverty — leaves a low-productivity agricultural sector which becomes, in combination with a lack of education, the strongest predictor of poverty: the poverty rate in households with an uneducated household head (17% of all households) is 48% (2019/20), while already households with a household head possessing primary education (also 17% of all) nearly cuts this in half with 25% poverty rate (2019/20) <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>.</p> <p><span class="citation" data-cites="Cali2014">Cali (<a href="#ref-Cali2014" role="doc-biblioref">2014</a>)</span> finds that, already, one of the primary determinants of income disparity in more trade-exposed markets of Uganda in the 1990s were the increasing education differences leading to more disparate wage premiums. Additionally, slow structural change — further impeded by the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, which pushed both urban and rural residents back into poverty — leaves a low-productivity agricultural sector which becomes, in combination with a lack of education, the strongest predictor of poverty: the poverty rate in households with an uneducated household head (17% of all households) is 48% (2019/20), while already households with a household head possessing primary education (also 17% of all) nearly cuts this in half with 25% poverty rate (2019/20) <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022h</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>The World Bank <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022e</a>)</span> calculated a Learning Poverty Indicator for Uganda which finds that 82% of children at late primary age are not proficient in reading, 81% of children do not achieve minimum proficiency level in reading at the end of primary schooling, and 4% of primary school-aged children are not enrolled in school at all. <span class="citation" data-cites="Datzberger2018">Datzberger (<a href="#ref-Datzberger2018" role="doc-biblioref">2018</a>)</span> argues these problems primarily exist in Uganda due to choosing an approach to education that is primarily assimilation-based, that is, intended to effect change at the individual-level through fostering grassroots education throughout society at large, instead of looking into more transformative policy approaches which would operate on a more systemic level, removing oppressive structures of inequality in tandem with government institutions at multiple levels.</p> <p>The World Bank <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022g</a>)</span> calculated a Learning Poverty Indicator for Uganda which finds that 82% of children at late primary age are not proficient in reading, 81% of children do not achieve minimum proficiency level in reading at the end of primary schooling, and 4% of primary school-aged children are not enrolled in school at all. <span class="citation" data-cites="Datzberger2018">Datzberger (<a href="#ref-Datzberger2018" role="doc-biblioref">2018</a>)</span> argues these problems primarily exist in Uganda due to choosing an approach to education that is primarily assimilation-based, that is, intended to effect change at the individual-level through fostering grassroots education throughout society at large, instead of looking into more transformative policy approaches which would operate on a more systemic level, removing oppressive structures of inequality in tandem with government institutions at multiple levels.</p>
<!-- water access --> <!-- water access -->
<section id="inequalities-in-access-to-drinking-water" class="level3"> <section id="inequalities-in-access-to-drinking-water" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="inequalities-in-access-to-drinking-water">Inequalities in access to drinking water</h3> <h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="inequalities-in-access-to-drinking-water">Inequalities in access to drinking water</h3>
<p>Such personal circumstances as access to a timely education play decisive role in life and human capital development — circumstances to which decent housing as well as access to clean water are equally fundamental building blocks <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>. In 1990 a policy initiative to shift from a supply-driven to a demand-driven model for rural drinking water provision was enacted which, over time, improved rural safe water coverage slightly but also made operation and maintenance of improved water sources pose a challenge that could impede long-term access to safe water.</p> <p>Such personal circumstances as access to a timely education play decisive role in life and human capital development — circumstances to which decent housing as well as access to clean water are equally fundamental building blocks <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022h</a>)</span>. In 1990 a policy initiative to shift from a supply-driven to a demand-driven model for rural drinking water provision was enacted which, over time, improved rural safe water coverage slightly but also made operation and maintenance of improved water sources pose a challenge that could impede long-term access to safe water.</p>
<p>In the country, access to improved water sources rose from 44% in 1990 to 60% in 2004 and 66% in 2010 <span class="citation" data-cites="Naiga2015">(<a href="#ref-Naiga2015" role="doc-biblioref">Naiga et al., 2015</a>)</span>. In 2019, access to improved sources of drinking water in the country is at a level of 87% in urban areas and 74% in rural areas, with relatively little inequality in rural regions between poor and non-poor households <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>.</p> <p>In the country, access to improved water sources rose from 44% in 1990 to 60% in 2004 and 66% in 2010 <span class="citation" data-cites="Naiga2015">(<a href="#ref-Naiga2015" role="doc-biblioref">Naiga et al., 2015</a>)</span>. In 2019, access to improved sources of drinking water in the country is at a level of 87% in urban areas and 74% in rural areas, with relatively little inequality in rural regions between poor and non-poor households <span class="citation" data-cites="Atamanov2022">(<a href="#ref-Atamanov2022" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022h</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Health care facilities in rural areas are generally well connected to improved sources with 94% of facilities having access to public stand posts, protected spring technology, deep boreholes and some to rain harvesting tanks, gravity flow schemes or groundwater-based pumped piped water supplies <span class="citation" data-cites="Mulogo2018">(<a href="#ref-Mulogo2018" role="doc-biblioref">Mulogo et al., 2018</a>)</span>. Thus, individual households are generally less well connected than health care facilities, and rural households in turn less well than urban households.</p> <p>Health care facilities in rural areas are generally well connected to improved sources with 94% of facilities having access to public stand posts, protected spring technology, deep boreholes and some to rain harvesting tanks, gravity flow schemes or groundwater-based pumped piped water supplies <span class="citation" data-cites="Mulogo2018">(<a href="#ref-Mulogo2018" role="doc-biblioref">Mulogo et al., 2018</a>)</span>. Thus, individual households are generally less well connected than health care facilities, and rural households in turn less well than urban households.</p>
<!-- Isingiro district --> <!-- Isingiro district -->
<p>The same study found for the Isingiro district in Western Uganda on the other hand, in 2010, only 28% of households had access to improved water <span class="citation" data-cites="Mulogo2018">(<a href="#ref-Mulogo2018" role="doc-biblioref">Mulogo et al., 2018</a>)</span>. <!-- TODO check validity --> <span class="citation" data-cites="Naiga2015">Naiga et al. (<a href="#ref-Naiga2015" role="doc-biblioref">2015</a>)</span> investigated the characteristics of improved water access in the Isingiro district, finding that whereas the national average distance to travel for a water source is 0.2km in urban and 0.8km in rural locations, in Isingiro it is 1.5km, and of the fewer existing improved water sources, only 53% were fully functional, with 24% being only partly functional (having only low or intermittent yield) and 18% not being functional at all. Additionally, they found blocked drainage channels in some of the sources which could in turn lead to a possible health risk due to contamination of the source.</p> <p>The same study found for the Isingiro district in Western Uganda on the other hand, in 2010, only 28% of households had access to improved water <span class="citation" data-cites="Mulogo2018">(<a href="#ref-Mulogo2018" role="doc-biblioref">Mulogo et al., 2018</a>)</span>. <!-- TODO check validity --> <span class="citation" data-cites="Naiga2015">Naiga et al. (<a href="#ref-Naiga2015" role="doc-biblioref">2015</a>)</span> investigated the characteristics of improved water access in the Isingiro district, finding that whereas the national average distance to travel for a water source is 0.2km in urban and 0.8km in rural locations, in Isingiro it is 1.5km, and of the fewer existing improved water sources, only 53% were fully functional, with 24% being only partly functional (having only low or intermittent yield) and 18% not being functional at all. Additionally, they found blocked drainage channels in some of the sources which could in turn lead to a possible health risk due to contamination of the source.</p>
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<hr> <hr>
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<p>Benin in recent years has seen fairly stable real GDP growth rates and downward trending poverty levels in absolute terms. Its growth rate averaged 6.4% for the years 2017 to 2019 and, with a decrease during the intermittent years due to the Covid-19 pandemic, has recovered to a rate of 6.6% in 2021 <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>. There only exists sporadic and fluctuating data on the country’s overall inequality, with the World Bank Development Index noting a Gini coefficient of 38.6 for the year (2003) before rising to 43.4 (2011) and up to 47.8 (2015), though decreasing below the 2003 level to 37.8 (2018) in its most recent calculation, see <a href="#fig-ben">Figure 7</a>. At the same time, the country’s poverty rate, even measured based on the international line, only decreased at a very slow rate in its most recent years, from a share of households in poverty at 18.8% in 2019, to 18.7% in 2020 and 18.3% at the end of 2021, with the reduction threatened to be slowed further through increased prices on food and energy <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Benin in recent years has seen fairly stable real GDP growth rates and downward trending poverty levels in absolute terms. Its growth rate averaged 6.4% for the years 2017 to 2019 and, with a decrease during the intermittent years due to the Covid-19 pandemic, has recovered to a rate of 6.6% in 2021 <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022e</a>)</span>. There only exists sporadic and fluctuating data on the country’s overall inequality, with the World Bank Development Index noting a Gini coefficient of 38.6 for the year (2003) before rising to 43.4 (2011) and up to 47.8 (2015), though decreasing below the 2003 level to 37.8 (2018) in its most recent calculation, see <a href="#fig-ben">Figure 7</a>. At the same time, the country’s poverty rate, even measured based on the international line, only decreased at a very slow rate in its most recent years, from a share of households in poverty at 18.8% in 2019, to 18.7% in 2020 and 18.3% at the end of 2021, with the reduction threatened to be slowed further through increased prices on food and energy <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022e</a>)</span>.</p>
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<p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p> <p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p>
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<!-- poverty --> <!-- poverty -->
<p>Based on its national poverty line, Benin’s overall poverty rate is 38.5%, though it hides a strong spatial disparity in the incidence of poverty between rural (44.2%) and urban (31.4) areas <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>. Looking at the effect of income growth on the time to exit poverty, <span class="citation" data-cites="Alia2017">Alia (<a href="#ref-Alia2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> finds a general negative correlation with stronger growth indeed leading to shorter average exit times (7-10 years for a household at a per capita growth rate of 4.2%), though this aggregate also hides a large heterogeneity primarily determined by a households size, its available human capital and whether it is located rurally. So while the study does conclude for an overall equitable pro-poor growth in Benin, rural households, beside already being relatively more poverty stricken, are in danger of being left further behind during periods of overall growth. <span class="citation" data-cites="Djossou2017">Djossou et al. (<a href="#ref-Djossou2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> find similar pro-poor growth with spatial disparities but surprisingly see urban households potentially benefiting less than rural households from additional growth, with efforts to open up communities to harness the benefits of growth often primarily targeted at rural communities.</p> <p>Based on its national poverty line, Benin’s overall poverty rate is 38.5%, though it hides a strong spatial disparity in the incidence of poverty between rural (44.2%) and urban (31.4) areas <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022b">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022b" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022e</a>)</span>. Looking at the effect of income growth on the time to exit poverty, <span class="citation" data-cites="Alia2017">Alia (<a href="#ref-Alia2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> finds a general negative correlation with stronger growth indeed leading to shorter average exit times (7-10 years for a household at a per capita growth rate of 4.2%), though this aggregate also hides a large heterogeneity primarily determined by a households size, its available human capital and whether it is located rurally. So while the study does conclude for an overall equitable pro-poor growth in Benin, rural households, beside already being relatively more poverty stricken, are in danger of being left further behind during periods of overall growth. <span class="citation" data-cites="Djossou2017">Djossou et al. (<a href="#ref-Djossou2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> find similar pro-poor growth with spatial disparities but surprisingly see urban households potentially benefiting less than rural households from additional growth, with efforts to open up communities to harness the benefits of growth often primarily targeted at rural communities.</p>
<!-- drivers: endowment/assets: education, ..? --> <!-- drivers: endowment/assets: education, ..? -->
<p>Using the Learning Poverty index, which combines the share of school deprivation (the share of primary-aged children out-of-school) and learning deprivation (share of pupils below a minimum proficiency in reading), a <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022a">World Bank (<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022a" role="doc-biblioref">2022a</a>)</span> report shows that 56% of children at late primary age in Benin are not proficient in reading, 55% do not achieve minimum proficiency levels at the end of primary school and 3% of primary school-aged children are not enrolled in school at all. <!-- TODO These levels are higher than in Uganda, though, since ... gender dimension? --> Looking purely at attendance rates, <span class="citation" data-cites="McNabb2018">McNabb (<a href="#ref-McNabb2018" role="doc-biblioref">2018</a>)</span> finds that the primary household-level determinants of attendance are the wealth of a household, its religion, as well as the education level of its household head. Here, gender disparities persist, however, with girls continuously less likely to attend and adopted girls being at the greatest disadvantage, while boys tend to face higher opportunity costs than girls due to often working in the fields in which case the distance to a school begins to play an important role. While the household-level variables do play a role — through the availability of educational resources at home, differences in schooling quality and overall health and well-being — <span class="citation" data-cites="Gruijters2020">Gruijters &amp; Behrman (<a href="#ref-Gruijters2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020</a>)</span> find that most of the disparity stems from the community-level: the difference in school quality is large, marked by high socio-economic segregation between schools, and primarily determined through an unequal distribution of teaching resources including teachers and textbooks.</p> <p>Using the Learning Poverty index, which combines the share of school deprivation (the share of primary-aged children out-of-school) and learning deprivation (share of pupils below a minimum proficiency in reading), a <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022a">World Bank (<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022a" role="doc-biblioref">2022b</a>)</span> report shows that 56% of children at late primary age in Benin are not proficient in reading, 55% do not achieve minimum proficiency levels at the end of primary school and 3% of primary school-aged children are not enrolled in school at all. <!-- TODO These levels are higher than in Uganda, though, since ... gender dimension? --> Looking purely at attendance rates, <span class="citation" data-cites="McNabb2018">McNabb (<a href="#ref-McNabb2018" role="doc-biblioref">2018</a>)</span> finds that the primary household-level determinants of attendance are the wealth of a household, its religion, as well as the education level of its household head. Here, gender disparities persist, however, with girls continuously less likely to attend and adopted girls being at the greatest disadvantage, while boys tend to face higher opportunity costs than girls due to often working in the fields in which case the distance to a school begins to play an important role. While the household-level variables do play a role — through the availability of educational resources at home, differences in schooling quality and overall health and well-being — <span class="citation" data-cites="Gruijters2020">Gruijters &amp; Behrman (<a href="#ref-Gruijters2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020</a>)</span> find that most of the disparity stems from the community-level: the difference in school quality is large, marked by high socio-economic segregation between schools, and primarily determined through an unequal distribution of teaching resources including teachers and textbooks.</p>
<p>Thus, while growth is generally pro-poor in Benin, its primary determinants do not cluster only at the household level, but are comprised of partly household-level but especially community-level differences.</p> <p>Thus, while growth is generally pro-poor in Benin, its primary determinants do not cluster only at the household level, but are comprised of partly household-level but especially community-level differences.</p>
<section id="inequalities-in-access-to-electricity" class="level3"> <section id="inequalities-in-access-to-electricity" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="inequalities-in-access-to-electricity">Inequalities in access to electricity</h3> <h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="inequalities-in-access-to-electricity">Inequalities in access to electricity</h3>
<!-- electricity access --> <!-- electricity access -->
<p>One of the foremost examples of the effects of inequal endowments can have is brought by <span class="citation" data-cites="VanDePoel2009">Van De Poel et al. (<a href="#ref-VanDePoel2009" role="doc-biblioref">2009</a>)</span> when they look at the determinants of rural infant death rates in Benin among others and find that environmental factors — such as access to a safe water source, quality housing materials and electricity — are the primary determinants, ahead even of access to a health facility in the community. Access to electricity in the country especially underlies a large heterogeneity based on location. The overall level of electrification of Benin has been rising slowly — though outpacing population growth — from 22% in 2000 to 26% in 2005, 34% in 2010, a decline to 30% in 2015 and then a faster increase to 40% in 2019, although a broad difference in electrification levels between urban (65%) and rural (17%) regions remain <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2021">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2021" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2021</a>)</span>.</p> <p>One of the foremost examples of the effects of inequal endowments can have is brought by <span class="citation" data-cites="VanDePoel2009">Van De Poel et al. (<a href="#ref-VanDePoel2009" role="doc-biblioref">2009</a>)</span> when they look at the determinants of rural infant death rates in Benin among others and find that environmental factors — such as access to a safe water source, quality housing materials and electricity — are the primary determinants, ahead even of access to a health facility in the community. Access to electricity in the country especially underlies a large heterogeneity based on location. The overall level of electrification of Benin has been rising slowly — though outpacing population growth — from 22% in 2000 to 26% in 2005, 34% in 2010, a decline to 30% in 2015 and then a faster increase to 40% in 2019, although a broad difference in electrification levels between urban (65%) and rural (17%) regions remain <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2021">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2021" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2021b</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>In rural areas there are generally three approaches to electrification that work outside of a connection to the main grid, individual installation of solar panels or generators for smaller electric appliances, collective solutions like kiosks offering electric charging for some cost, or autonomous mini-grids powering a portion of a more densely populated rural area (though often requiring permits or licenses if above certain sizes) <span class="citation" data-cites="Jaglin2019">(<a href="#ref-Jaglin2019" role="doc-biblioref">Jaglin, 2019</a>)</span>.</p> <p>In rural areas there are generally three approaches to electrification that work outside of a connection to the main grid, individual installation of solar panels or generators for smaller electric appliances, collective solutions like kiosks offering electric charging for some cost, or autonomous mini-grids powering a portion of a more densely populated rural area (though often requiring permits or licenses if above certain sizes) <span class="citation" data-cites="Jaglin2019">(<a href="#ref-Jaglin2019" role="doc-biblioref">Jaglin, 2019</a>)</span>.</p>
<p><span class="citation" data-cites="Rateau2022">Rateau &amp; Choplin (<a href="#ref-Rateau2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022</a>)</span> see one of the primary reasons for off-grid electrification in either physical unavailability in rural areas or a prohibitively high cost for connection to the grid. However, these more individualized solutions are often only targeted at credit-worthy customers and can lead to a further increase in inequalities between income percentiles, leaving behind households which are already neglected within the field of energy access <span class="citation" data-cites="Barry2020">(<a href="#ref-Barry2020" role="doc-biblioref">Barry &amp; Creti, 2020</a>)</span>. The former, physical access, is argued by <span class="citation" data-cites="Djossou2017">Djossou et al. (<a href="#ref-Djossou2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> as well, emphasizing the need for continued infrastructure expansion to more households, in order to provide access to more durable goods (fridges, mobile phones and internet) which can help decrease the inequality gap. The latter, prohibitively high costs, should not be disregarded in such an infrastructure expansion as well, however.</p> <p><span class="citation" data-cites="Rateau2022">Rateau &amp; Choplin (<a href="#ref-Rateau2022" role="doc-biblioref">2022</a>)</span> see one of the primary reasons for off-grid electrification in either physical unavailability in rural areas or a prohibitively high cost for connection to the grid. However, these more individualized solutions are often only targeted at credit-worthy customers and can lead to a further increase in inequalities between income percentiles, leaving behind households which are already neglected within the field of energy access <span class="citation" data-cites="Barry2020">(<a href="#ref-Barry2020" role="doc-biblioref">Barry &amp; Creti, 2020</a>)</span>. The former, physical access, is argued by <span class="citation" data-cites="Djossou2017">Djossou et al. (<a href="#ref-Djossou2017" role="doc-biblioref">2017</a>)</span> as well, emphasizing the need for continued infrastructure expansion to more households, in order to provide access to more durable goods (fridges, mobile phones and internet) which can help decrease the inequality gap. The latter, prohibitively high costs, should not be disregarded in such an infrastructure expansion as well, however.</p>
<p>One of the major obstacles to main grid connection remains the high charge a customer is expected to pay with solutions requiring continued political commitment to identify, examine and implement more low-cost electrification processes as well as financing solutions. <span class="citation" data-cites="Golumbeanu2013">Golumbeanu &amp; Barnes (<a href="#ref-Golumbeanu2013" role="doc-biblioref">2013</a>)</span> point out the main obstacles that need to be addressed here: the lack of incentives to increase electrical affordability, a weak utilities commitment toward providing broad electricity access with focus often lying more on high-consumption urban markets, often overrated technical specifications for low loads, too great distances between households and distribution poles in an area, and an overall lack of affordable financing solutions.</p> <p>One of the major obstacles to main grid connection remains the high charge a customer is expected to pay with solutions requiring continued political commitment to identify, examine and implement more low-cost electrification processes as well as financing solutions. <span class="citation" data-cites="Golumbeanu2013">Golumbeanu &amp; Barnes (<a href="#ref-Golumbeanu2013" role="doc-biblioref">2013</a>)</span> point out the main obstacles that need to be addressed here: the lack of incentives to increase electrical affordability, a weak utilities commitment toward providing broad electricity access with focus often lying more on high-consumption urban markets, often overrated technical specifications for low loads, too great distances between households and distribution poles in an area, and an overall lack of affordable financing solutions.</p>
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<p>Djibouti occupies a somewhat singular position, being a tiny country with an economy focused primarily around its deep-water port, trying to establish itself as a regional hub for trade and commerce. The country’s GDP has averaged roughly 6% per year before the Covid-19 pandemic greatly reduced those growth rates <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>. However, the country’s inequality levels are high (Gini coefficient 41.6) and its poverty rates are extreme <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(21.1%, <a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>. Additionally in many cases there is a lack of data or the data itself are lacking in several socio-economic dimensions which hinders analysis and policy design.</p> <p>Djibouti occupies a somewhat singular position, being a tiny country with an economy focused primarily around its deep-water port, trying to establish itself as a regional hub for trade and commerce. The country’s GDP has averaged roughly 6% per year before the Covid-19 pandemic greatly reduced those growth rates <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>. However, the country’s inequality levels are high (Gini coefficient 41.6) and its poverty rates are extreme <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(21.1%, <a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>. Additionally in many cases there is a lack of data or the data itself are lacking in several socio-economic dimensions which hinders analysis and policy design.</p>
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<p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p> <p>Source: Author’s elaboration based on UNU-WIDER WIID (2022).</p>
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<p>Poverty in Djibouti is high and marked by high deprivation: Using the national poverty line of around 2.18USD (2011 PPP) the poverty rate for the overall country by consumption is estimated at 21.1% in 2017, while 17% live in extreme poverty under the international poverty line of 1.90USD (2011 PPP) and 32% of the population are still under the international lower middle income poverty line of 3.20USD (2011 PPP) <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019 WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>, <a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">2022d</a>)</span>. Furthermore, there is a significant spatial disparity between poverty rates. <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">World Bank (<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020a</a>)</span> estimate only 15% of Djibouti’s overall population living in rural areas, with 45% of the country’s poor residing in rural areas while 37% reside in the Balbala<a href="#fn2" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref2" role="doc-noteref"><sup>2</sup></a> area <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020a</a>)</span>. The study goes on to describe the high levels of deprivation for the rural poor, with the country’s highest dependency ratios, lowest participation in the labor force, very low levels of employment in the households’ heads and very low school enrollment, and while urban poor face similar restrictions they have better access to public services and higher school attendance rates. Access to basic amenities and services in Djibouti is low (42.1%) and 15.5% of the population have no access to both electricity and sanitation, and all people in monetary poverty are also deprived along multiple dimensions <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2020">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020b</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Poverty in Djibouti is high and marked by high deprivation: Using the national poverty line of around 2.18USD (2011 PPP) the poverty rate for the overall country by consumption is estimated at 21.1% in 2017, while 17% live in extreme poverty under the international poverty line of 1.90USD (2011 PPP) and 32% of the population are still under the international lower middle income poverty line of 3.20USD (2011 PPP) <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019 WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>, <a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">2022f</a>)</span>. Furthermore, there is a significant spatial disparity between poverty rates. <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">World Bank (<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020b</a>)</span> estimate only 15% of Djibouti’s overall population living in rural areas, with 45% of the country’s poor residing in rural areas while 37% reside in the Balbala<a href="#fn2" class="footnote-ref" id="fnref2" role="doc-noteref"><sup>2</sup></a> area <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020b</a>)</span>. The study goes on to describe the high levels of deprivation for the rural poor, with the country’s highest dependency ratios, lowest participation in the labor force, very low levels of employment in the households’ heads and very low school enrollment, and while urban poor face similar restrictions they have better access to public services and higher school attendance rates. Access to basic amenities and services in Djibouti is low (42.1%) and 15.5% of the population have no access to both electricity and sanitation, and all people in monetary poverty are also deprived along multiple dimensions <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2020">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020c</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Over half the working-age population does not participate in the labor force with employment being estimated at 45% in 2017, lower than the 46.3% estimated for 1996, despite the country’s economic growth <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <span class="citation" data-cites="Emara2020">Emara &amp; Mohieldin (<a href="#ref-Emara2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020</a>)</span> look at the overall impact of financial inclusion on poverty levels but find that, first, Djibouti is way above its targeted poverty levels, second, it is not only one of the only countries in the region (together with Yemen) to not achieve a 5% poverty level target yet, but not even on track to achieve this target by 2030 solely through improvements in financial inclusion.</p> <p>Over half the working-age population does not participate in the labor force with employment being estimated at 45% in 2017, lower than the 46.3% estimated for 1996, despite the country’s economic growth <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <span class="citation" data-cites="Emara2020">Emara &amp; Mohieldin (<a href="#ref-Emara2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020</a>)</span> look at the overall impact of financial inclusion on poverty levels but find that, first, Djibouti is way above its targeted poverty levels, second, it is not only one of the only countries in the region (together with Yemen) to not achieve a 5% poverty level target yet, but not even on track to achieve this target by 2030 solely through improvements in financial inclusion.</p>
<!-- inequality --> <!-- inequality -->
<p>Inequality in Djibouti is high, with the lowest decile only making up 1.9% of total consumption while the richest decile enjoy 32% of the total consumption, 16 times as much as those at the lowest decile <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. The country has an estimated Gini coefficient for consumption per capita of 41.6 in 2017, making it one of the most unequal countries in the region <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>, see also <a href="#fig-dji" role="doc-biblioref">Figure 10</a>)</span>. More of its inequality hides in a large spatial and gendered heterogeneity. Urban poor face high deprivation but higher access to public services and schooling compared to the rural poor, who have only 41% access to improved water sources, 10% access to sanitation, 3% access to electricity, and with only one third living close (under 1km) to a primary school <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020a</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Inequality in Djibouti is high, with the lowest decile only making up 1.9% of total consumption while the richest decile enjoy 32% of the total consumption, 16 times as much as those at the lowest decile <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. The country has an estimated Gini coefficient for consumption per capita of 41.6 in 2017, making it one of the most unequal countries in the region <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>, see also <a href="#fig-dji" role="doc-biblioref">Figure 10</a>)</span>. More of its inequality hides in a large spatial and gendered heterogeneity. Urban poor face high deprivation but higher access to public services and schooling compared to the rural poor, who have only 41% access to improved water sources, 10% access to sanitation, 3% access to electricity, and with only one third living close (under 1km) to a primary school <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020b</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>While in general over half the working-age population does not participate in the labor force, the makeup is 59% of men and only 32% of women who participate, mirroring unemployment rates with an estimated third of men and two thirds of women being unemployed <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">World Bank (<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">2019</a>)</span> also find the labor market itself highly unequal, with its dichotomy of a public administrative sector (drawing mainly highly skilled workers) and informal private sector making up 90% of the overall labor market, the majority of women working in the informal sector and almost half of the jobs for women in this sector consisting of one-person ‘self-employed’ enterprises. Nearly 41% of working-age women find themselves in positions of vulnerable employment <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022b</a>)</span>.</p> <p>While in general over half the working-age population does not participate in the labor force, the makeup is 59% of men and only 32% of women who participate, mirroring unemployment rates with an estimated third of men and two thirds of women being unemployed <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">World Bank (<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">2019</a>)</span> also find the labor market itself highly unequal, with its dichotomy of a public administrative sector (drawing mainly highly skilled workers) and informal private sector making up 90% of the overall labor market, the majority of women working in the informal sector and almost half of the jobs for women in this sector consisting of one-person ‘self-employed’ enterprises. Nearly 41% of working-age women find themselves in positions of vulnerable employment <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>.</p>
<!-- drivers --> <!-- drivers -->
<p>Djibouti’s economy is primarily, and within its formal sector almost exclusively, driven by its strategic location and possession of a deep-water port so it can act as a regional refueling, trading and transport shipment center <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>. At the same time, this interconnected economic nature and the country’s heavy reliance on food and energy imports marks a key vulnerability and makes it immediately dependent on the stability of global trade and export markets, a stability which was recently disrupted through a global pandemic <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Djibouti’s economy is primarily, and within its formal sector almost exclusively, driven by its strategic location and possession of a deep-water port so it can act as a regional refueling, trading and transport shipment center <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>. At the same time, this interconnected economic nature and the country’s heavy reliance on food and energy imports marks a key vulnerability and makes it immediately dependent on the stability of global trade and export markets, a stability which was recently disrupted through a global pandemic <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Likewise, Djibouti depends on regional stability, since its economic growth is tightly coupled with the Ethiopian economy, sourcing around 70% of its port trade from this landlocked neighbor <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. A series of droughts in the country threatened the livelihood of its nomadic and pastoralist population, with many fleeing to neighboring countries, some becoming sedentary in village or city outskirts, and the overall nomadic population decreasing by nearly three quarters from 2009 to 2017 <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020 Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>, <a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020a</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Likewise, Djibouti depends on regional stability, since its economic growth is tightly coupled with the Ethiopian economy, sourcing around 70% of its port trade from this landlocked neighbor <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. A series of droughts in the country threatened the livelihood of its nomadic and pastoralist population, with many fleeing to neighboring countries, some becoming sedentary in village or city outskirts, and the overall nomadic population decreasing by nearly three quarters from 2009 to 2017 <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020 Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>, <a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">2020b</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Additionally, during the early waves of Covid-19 Djibouti had one of the highest infection rates in the region, and though it had a high recovery rate, it also had one of the highest fatality rates, possibly due to deficiencies in its healthcare system <span class="citation" data-cites="ElKhamlichi2022">(<a href="#ref-ElKhamlichi2022" role="doc-biblioref">El Khamlichi et al., 2022</a>)</span>. The country’s rising costs of now fast-maturing debts made the government leave social spending behind, leaving a budget of 5% for health and 3% for social expenditures, spendings which looks diminutive compared to its over 30% expenditures on public infrastructure <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022d</a>)</span>. Only 10% of rural poor inhabitants live close (under 1km) to a health facility <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020a</a>)</span>.</p> <p>Additionally, during the early waves of Covid-19 Djibouti had one of the highest infection rates in the region, and though it had a high recovery rate, it also had one of the highest fatality rates, possibly due to deficiencies in its healthcare system <span class="citation" data-cites="ElKhamlichi2022">(<a href="#ref-ElKhamlichi2022" role="doc-biblioref">El Khamlichi et al., 2022</a>)</span>. The country’s rising costs of now fast-maturing debts made the government leave social spending behind, leaving a budget of 5% for health and 3% for social expenditures, spendings which looks diminutive compared to its over 30% expenditures on public infrastructure <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022c">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022c" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022f</a>)</span>. Only 10% of rural poor inhabitants live close (under 1km) to a health facility <span class="citation" data-cites="Ibarra2020">(<a href="#ref-Ibarra2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020b</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>While still facing reduced rates of labor market participation, the country has expended effort on increasing women’s opportunity for education: Having overall lower literacy rates for women still, the overall literacy rates in younger cohorts (10-24 years old) is significantly higher compared to older ones, and the gaps have decreased from 24% difference between the genders (40-60 years old) to 10% (15-24 years old) and 2% (10-14 years old) <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>.</p>
<section id="gender-inequalities-in-livelihood-opportunities" class="level3"> <section id="gender-inequalities-in-livelihood-opportunities" class="level3">
<h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="gender-inequalities-in-livelihood-opportunities">Gender inequalities in livelihood opportunities</h3> <h3 class="anchored" data-anchor-id="gender-inequalities-in-livelihood-opportunities">Gender inequalities in livelihood opportunities</h3>
<p>Women’s lower secondary completion rate grew from 28.6% in 2009 (compared to 35.2% men) to 56.3% in 2021 (54.0% for men) <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022b</a>)</span>. However, for 2017, women’s upward educational mobility was still significantly worse than men’s, with non-poor men having an upward mobility of 53%, non-poor women 29%, poor men 19% and poor women only 10% against the national average of 36% <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <!-- trade and inclusion --> Such differences reflect themselves in firm ownership structures and on the labor market, where 22.3% of all firms have female participation in ownership and only 14.2% a female top manager, and both salaried employment and agricultural employment are male-dominated (though agricultural work only with a slight and shrinking difference of 4%) <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022b</a>)</span>.</p> <p>While still facing reduced rates of labor market participation, the country has expended effort on increasing women’s opportunity for education: Having overall lower literacy rates for women still, the overall literacy rates in younger cohorts (10-24 years old) is significantly higher compared to older ones, and the gaps have decreased from 24% difference between the genders (40-60 years old) to 10% (15-24 years old) and 2% (10-14 years old) <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Women’s lower secondary completion rate grew from 28.6% in 2009 (compared to 35.2% men) to 56.3% in 2021 (54.0% for men) <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>. However, for 2017, women’s upward educational mobility was still significantly worse than men’s, with non-poor men having an upward mobility of 53%, non-poor women 29%, poor men 19% and poor women only 10% against the national average of 36% <span class="citation" data-cites="Mendiratta2019">(<a href="#ref-Mendiratta2019" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2019</a>)</span>. <!-- trade and inclusion --> Such differences reflect themselves in firm ownership structures and on the labor market, where 22.3% of all firms have female participation in ownership and only 14.2% a female top manager, and both salaried employment and agricultural employment are male-dominated (though agricultural work only with a slight and shrinking difference of 4%) <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022d">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022d" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022c</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>The official number of procedures to register a business are the same for men and women, as are the time and cost required for business start-up procedures <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2020">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2020" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2020a</a>)</span>, however, there are factors which may further inhibit equal female business participation and ownership: while women have the same legal rights in access to credit, contractual and financial instruments as men <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022f">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022f" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022i</a>)</span>, women have an overall lower account ownership rate at financial institutions with 8.8% compared to men’s 16.6% (2011) reflecting itself especially in a lower access to debit cards at institutions <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2021a">World Bank (<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022g" role="doc-biblioref">2022a</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>As mentioned above, women have a lower participation rate on the labor market with an especially stark gender difference in the industrial sector — a sector of the economy in which women in Djibouti do not have the same rights to participate in as men, especially in jobs deemed dangerous <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022f">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022f" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022i</a>)</span> — with service being the sector that makes up the greatest share of female labor participation (71.1% of all female labor compared to 56.0% of all male labor 2019), a sector which is also driving the high share of women in vulnerable employment (41.4% of female labor in 2019) <span class="citation" data-cites="WorldBank2022g">(<a href="#ref-WorldBank2022g" role="doc-biblioref">World Bank, 2022a</a>)</span>.</p>
<p>Overall it seems, however, that past growth in the country’s GDP is likely not favorable for an inclusive growth path, with its large-scale infrastructure investments mostly creating demand for skilled workers and neglect of social spending not allowing the buffers and social safety nets that prevent further drift into inequality. <span class="citation" data-cites="Brass2008">Brass (<a href="#ref-Brass2008" role="doc-biblioref">2008</a>)</span> argues even that the country leadership’s policy decisions carry increased weight in this, towards a path of ever increasing economic dependence and into a predicament of economic diversification requiring a more educated population, but a more educated population without already accompanying diversified economy likely enacting a successful policy or governmental opposition.</p> <p>Overall it seems, however, that past growth in the country’s GDP is likely not favorable for an inclusive growth path, with its large-scale infrastructure investments mostly creating demand for skilled workers and neglect of social spending not allowing the buffers and social safety nets that prevent further drift into inequality. <span class="citation" data-cites="Brass2008">Brass (<a href="#ref-Brass2008" role="doc-biblioref">2008</a>)</span> argues even that the country leadership’s policy decisions carry increased weight in this, towards a path of ever increasing economic dependence and into a predicament of economic diversification requiring a more educated population, but a more educated population without already accompanying diversified economy likely enacting a successful policy or governmental opposition.</p>
<!-- conclusion --> <!-- conclusion -->
<p>Thus, Djibouti represents a country with an overall solid growth rate but accompanying high inequalities and poverty rates, from which path it does not seem to detach without more policy intervention. It is a country with one of the highest poverty rates in the region and an enormous spatial disparity in poverty between the prime sectors of Djibouti city and the rest of the country. The rural sectors face high levels of deprivation, economic disparity and largely lacking infrastructure, and the majority of its population not participating in the labor force. The country’s labor market is to the largest degree dichotomized in the public administrative sector, comprised of mostly skilled workers, and a large private informal sector comprised mostly of unskilled workers, many of which are women. The overall economy is dependent on high levels of regional and global stability which was recently undermined by droughts, Ethiopian conflict and the Covid-19 pandemic. Nomadic and pastoralist people in the country’s rural regions were hit especially hard, with the nomadic population decreasing by nearly three quarters and many fleeing or becoming sedentary. Women face less opportunity in the country with worse upward educational mobility, less participation in the labor force, higher unemployment rates, and a continuing, if closing, gender literacy gap. Djibouti is set to miss most of its poverty target levels and move along a growth pathway that does not lend itself to inclusion unless active policy measures changing its economic investment and growth strategies are examined.</p> <p>Thus, Djibouti represents a country with an overall solid growth rate but accompanying high inequalities and poverty rates, from which path it does not seem to detach without more policy intervention. It is a country with one of the highest poverty rates in the region and an enormous spatial disparity in poverty between the prime sectors of Djibouti city and the rest of the country. The rural sectors face high levels of deprivation, economic disparity and largely lacking infrastructure, and the majority of its population not participating in the labor force. The country’s labor market is to the largest degree dichotomized in the public administrative sector, comprised of mostly skilled workers, and a large private informal sector comprised mostly of unskilled workers, many of which are women. The overall economy is dependent on high levels of regional and global stability which was recently undermined by droughts, Ethiopian conflict and the Covid-19 pandemic. Nomadic and pastoralist people in the country’s rural regions were hit especially hard, with the nomadic population decreasing by nearly three quarters and many fleeing or becoming sedentary. Women face less opportunity in the country with worse upward educational mobility, less participation in the labor force, higher unemployment rates, and a continuing, if closing, gender literacy gap. Djibouti is set to miss most of its poverty target levels and move along a growth pathway that does not lend itself to inclusion unless active policy measures changing its economic investment and growth strategies are examined.</p>
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