abstract: 'We analyse the question of optimal taxation in a dual economy, when the

  policy-maker is concerned about the distribution of labour income.

  Income inequality is caused by the presence of sunk capital investments,

  which creates a ``good jobs{''''} sector due to the capture of quasi-rents

  by trade unions. With strong unions and high planner preference for

  income equality, the optimal policy is a combination of investment

  subsidies and progressive income taxation. If unions are weaker, the

  policy-maker may instead choose to tax investment.'
affiliation: 'Lommerud, KE (Corresponding Author), Univ Bergen, N-5007 Bergen, Norway.

  Univ Bergen, N-5007 Bergen, Norway.'
author: Lommerud, KE and Sandvik, B and Straume, OR
author-email: 'kjell-erik.lommerud@econ.uib.no

  bjorn.sandvik@econ.uib.no

  odd.straume@econ.uib.no'
author_list:
- family: Lommerud
  given: KE
- family: Sandvik
  given: B
- family: Straume
  given: OR
da: '2023-09-28'
doi: 10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00384.x
eissn: 1467-9442
files: []
issn: 0347-0520
journal: SCANDINAVIAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
keywords: rent sharing; optimal taxation; redistribution
keywords-plus: 'PROGRESSIVE TAXATION; URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT; TAX PROGRESSIVITY; EMPLOYMENT;

  WAGES; MODEL'
language: English
number: '4'
number-of-cited-references: '35'
orcid-numbers: Straume, Odd Rune/0000-0002-6889-2717
pages: 703-720
papis_id: 98d4141c095e528dac1787e841f00144
ref: Lommerud2004goodjobs
researcherid-numbers: Straume, Odd Rune/B-6090-2009
times-cited: '7'
title: Good jobs, bad jobs and redistribution
type: Article
unique-id: WOS:000225687300006
usage-count-last-180-days: '0'
usage-count-since-2013: '9'
volume: '106'
web-of-science-categories: Economics
year: '2004'