cite: Li2022
author: Li, Y., & Sunder, N.
year: 2022
title: Land inequality and workfare policies
publisher: Journal of development studies
uri: https://doi.org/10.1080/00220388.2021.2008362
pubtype: article
discipline: development

country: India
period: 2005-2006
maxlength: 12
targeting: implicit
group: potential labour force
data: Indian Agricultural Census (2000, 2005); national administrative panel data MGNREGA public data portal

design: quasi-experimental
method: OLS, instrumental variable approach
sample: 414
unit: district
representativeness: national, census
causal: 1 # 0 correlation / 1 causal

theory: political capture theory
limitations: sample attrition in matching NREGA districts to GINI data; assumption of no institutional/cultural unobservables
observation:
  - intervention: work programme
    institutional: 0
    structural: 1
    agency: 0
    inequality: income; spatial
    type: 0 # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
    indicator: 0 # 0 absolute / 1 relative
    measures: employment (LFP rate per land ownership through Gini)
    findings: work programme generally increases LFP; but internal heterogeneity, difference in job provision not due to public job demand changes, caste, religion; previous capital inequality (land ownership) strongly affects programme efficacy
    channels: landlords oppose implementation due to general wage increases following, lobby against workfare introduction; decreased bargaining power of labour in more inequal districts
    direction: 1 # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
    significance: 2 # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg

notes:
annotation: |
  A study on the effects of previous inequalities on the outcomes of a work programme in India intended to provide job opportunity equality for already disadvantages population.
  It specifically looks at the NREGA programme in India, and takes the land-ownership inequality measured through the Gini coefficient as its preceding inequality.[^nrega]
  The study finds that there is significantly negative relationship between the Gini coefficient and the provision of jobs through the work programme.
  In other words, the workfare policy implemented at least in part to reduce a district's inequality seems to be less effective if there is a larger prior capital inequality.
  The authors see the primary channel to be the landlords' opposition to broad workfare programme introduction since they are often followed by overall wage increases in the districts.
  They suggest that in more inequally distributed channels the landlords can use a more unequal power structure to lobby and effect political power decreasing the effectiveness of the programmes,
  in addition to often reduced collective bargaining power on the side of labour in these districts.
  The results show the same trends for measurement of land inequality using the share of land owned by the top 10 per cent largest holdings instead.

  [^nrega]: The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGA) is a workfare programme implemented in India, the largest of its kind, which seeks to provide 100 days of employment for each household per year. It was rolled out from 2005 over several phases until it reached all districts in India in 2008.