Add wos sample results library
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abstract: 'Shortly after the crucial political changes connected with the events in
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November 1989 in Czechoslovakia, some differences in political attitudes
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and behavior of the Czech and Slovak population appeared. An increasing
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tension in the Czech - Slovak relations finally led to a peaceful
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dissociation of the federal Czechoslovakia and to the formation of two
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sovereign states at the beginning of 1993. It is no wonder that this
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important change caused a serious discussion of social scientists of the
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both societies about the societal reasons and consequences of this
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unexpected and sudden historical and political phenomenon. The author of
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the present study in agreement with Jiri Musil prefers the comparison of
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different developments of cultural and social structures in the Czech
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lands and Slovakia to somewhat superficial historical and politological
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analyses of the split as a unique event.
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He disposes at some serious and historically relevant sociological
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evidence concerning the development of Czech-Slovak relationships,
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namely with the results of some representative Czech and Slovak
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sociological surveys, particularly from the years 1967, 1984, 1998,
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April 1993 and October 1993. Except the 1984 survey, he personally
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participated in all of them.
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In the second half of the 1960s, the Czech lands and Slovakia
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substantially differed in cultural and social respect. Above all one
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could observe big differences concerning the degree od urbanization in
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favour of the Czech lands. Slovakia remained then a country with
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settlement structure of rural type and with much more traditional way of
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life.
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A similar lag was characteristic for the structure of economically
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active population in respect to industrial branches. In the 1960s, the
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Czech lands belonged, according to their pre-war traditions and in the
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consequence of the enforced repeated industrialization (for military
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needs of the Soviet block in the period of the Cold War), to extensively
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industrialized societies, whereas Slovakia was rather a rural-industrial
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society where a recently started extensive industrialization went on.
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Towards the end of the 1960s the educational level of the Slovak
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population was already relatively close to that of the Czech one,
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although some distinctions still remained.
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At the same time, many important differences lasted in the material
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level of household equipment which was relatively better in the Czech
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lands. On the other hand, in consequence of the redistributive economic
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system, the average earnings were already nearly equal.
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In autumn 1967, on the very eve of the political crisis which signalized
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the outburst of events known as Prague Spring 1968, a large sociological
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survey of a representative sample of adult males dealing with social
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stratification and mobility was carried out by the Czech and Slovak
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sociologists in cooperation with the State Statistical Office. Its
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results were published two years later, unfortunately already after the
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Warsaw Pact Intervention which led to the defeat of the reform attempt
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connected with the Prague Spring. A special chapter in this book was
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written by a group of Slovak sociologists headed by R. Rosko. The
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authors proved that the social status distribution in Slovakia was in
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the late 1960s significantly lower in the average than the analogical
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distribution in the Czech lands. It was caused by small differences in
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the participation of individuals in management, in the level of work
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complexity typical for the occupational structures in question, and in
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the distribution of earnings; by more remarkable differences in level of
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education and material equipment of households; and by large differences
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concerning average income per capita, standards of consumption and
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cultural level of the life-style. In general, these findings
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demonstrated a still lasting deep cultural and social inequality of the
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Czech and Slovak part of the country. This social unbalance was
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multiplied by the consequences of the anti-Slovak political repressions
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in the late 1940s and in the 1950s and of the `''constitutional reform''''
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from 1960 which brought suppression of the Slovak autonomy in favour of
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the centralized bureaucratic Prague administration. All these
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circumstances stimulated a high dissatisfaction of the relatively
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younger population of Slovakia living in conditions of a rapid
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demographic development, progress of urbanization and industrialization.
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It was important for the specific character of the social and political
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reform movement in 1968 on the Slovak territory which finally caused one
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of the few real successes of the Prague Spring - the constitutional act
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declaring federalization of the Czechoslovak Republic.
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In the practical politics of the `''normalization'''' regime installed by
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the Soviet intervention in August 1968, the originally intended
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federative arrangement was `''via facti'''' replaced by a new version of
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the totalitarian and bureaucratic centralism. However, this time the
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political regime was in a sense more favourable for Slovakia. The Slovak
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Communist leaders gained for more better and in some respect even
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decisive positions in the Prague central administration of the country
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than any time before. Some changes in this respect occurred only in the
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late 1980s. In consequence of all this, the process of the secondary
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redistribution of the GDP in favor of Slovakia not only continued but
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even intensified in the 1970s and 1980s. Simultaneously, political
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oppressions concerning hundreds of thousands of participants in the
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Prague Spring events were in this period sensibly weaker in Slovakia
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than in the Czech lands. Thus, paradoxically, the `''normalization
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regime'''' brought some advantages for Slovakia as compared with the past.
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Some evidence for this can be find in the data collected by Czech
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sociologists in the sociological survey on `''class and social
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structure'''' in 1984, i.e. shortly before the beginning of the Soviet
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`''perestroika''''. A recent secondary analysis of this data shows
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therefore a cultural and social situation typical for the normalization
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system on the top point of its development. It is not very surprising
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that thanks to the permanent operation of the redistributive mechanisms
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during fifteen years after the final defeat of the Prague Spring the
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cultural and social characteristics of the Czech and Slovak adult
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populations were mutually much closer in 1984 than in 1967. There
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remained practically no differences in work complexity and in average
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earnings. The quality of housing was approximately the same. The
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households were telephonized in very close percentages. People were
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equally active in professional studying and in political activities (in
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official politics, of course). In some respects small differences in
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favour of the Czech population still existed. This is true as far as the
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global educational level, the percentage of managers and some items of
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the households equipment are concerned. In their leisure, Czech
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population was more frequently engaged in typically urban cultural
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activities. The Slovak population lived in a substantially higher
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percentage in their own private houses, in more rooms per family and in
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better environment than the Czech did. They had in more cases gardens or
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other land at their disposal and devoted themselves more frequently to
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domestic agricultural work. They also were more active in social
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contacts, in visiting relatives, neighbours and friends.
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Still slightly better economic position of the households in the Czech
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lands - caused partly by lower average number of the more aged Czech
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families - expressed itself in somewhat higher evaluation of the
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standard of living from the part of the Czech population.
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In other words, in the midst of the 1980s, the cultural and social
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characteristics of the Slovak population were already close to the Czech
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standards but some lag in this respect still existed. Anyway, the Czech
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lands represented the stagnating part of the federation, while Slovakia
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was the progressing one.
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The beginning of the Soviet perestroika signalized the Czech population
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that a new historical crisis of the Soviet-type societies was coming.
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Feelings of dissatisfaction with the stagnation of the Czech lands
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combined with political frustration of the citizens of an occupied
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country gradually grew up, particularly when some difficulties
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concerning standard of living emerged in the second half of the 1980s. A
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certain dissappointment caused by the unwillingness of the Gorbatchev''s
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leadership to revise the Soviet official attitude to the events of 1968
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also played an important role. The Slovak population living still under
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the protection of current redistributive processes and under a little
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better political conditions did not feel these changes as intensively as
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the Czech did. It is no wonder that these specificities influenced the
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subjective evaluations of the economic, social, political and cultural
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situation in the country. In the public opinion polls from the second
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half of the 1980s, the degree of satisfaction of the Slovak population
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concerning nearly all questions asked then was significantly higher than
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that of the Czech citizens. Gradually, as the crisis of 1989 was coming
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nearer, the evaluations were less and less favourable for the regime in
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both republics. However, the Czech criticism grew more rapidly than the
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criticism of the population in Slovakia.
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The `''Velvet Revolution'''' of 1989 was initiated mainly by the Czech
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dissidents and the politically active part of the Czech people. It found
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an active response also in analogical groups in Slovakia. However, in
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the course of the year 1990, when the outline of the radical economic
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reform was prepared by the Federal Government and the first practical
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steps of it were undertaken, a new shift in the structure of value
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orientations occurred. Of crucial significance was above all the
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declaration of President Havel demanding the liquidation of the arms
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producing industry, strongly developed particularly in Slovakia, and the
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first measures to its realization.
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The author of the study disposes at representative data from the survey
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on social transformation (autumn 1991) confronting the objective status
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positions of the adult population with their subjective attitudes. As
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far as the objective characteristics are concerned, the results of the
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survey on social transformation were summoned by the author in 1992 as
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follows:
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`''We discussed systematically all the relevant partial dimensions of the
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social position (status)...In all of these dimensions we could record
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only two significant signals of larger social differences. The first of
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them is a better standard of housing and a bigger amount of family
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fortunes in Slovakia (relativized, of course, by higher numerousness of
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families...). The second is a more often declaration of the subjective
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feelings of a worse market and especially financial attainability of
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consumption goods and services in Slovakia as well. In behind of this
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statement is hidden a more significant factor of a lower income per
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capita, connected with the already mentioned higher number of family
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members, and a different perception of the reality, influenced by the
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difference of social dynamics in the both republics. In no case,
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however, it is possible to speak about two fundamentally different
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status hierarchies with an essentially distinct context corresponding to
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two different phases of the civilization and cultural development.''''
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In other words, the cultural and social processes typical of the 1970s
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and 1980s, namely the stagnation and the beginning of an absolute
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decline in the Czech Republic and the continuing (although also limited
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by the character of the totalitarian and anti-meritocratic social system
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common for both of the two parts of the Federation) relative progress in
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Slovakia led to a nearly full equalization of the social unbalance which
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had been observed in 1967.
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On the other hand, the data from 1991 revealed a deep discrepancy
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between the balanced objective data and large differences of the
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subjective perception of the social situation. In principle, the
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evaluation both of the past and of the future transformation processes
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was much more favourable in the Czech than in the Slovak Republic.
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The most apparent differences in evaluation between the two republics
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could be found in the fields of standard of living and of social
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security.
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It was quite clear that such deep differences in attitudes could not be
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explained by those objective facts that revealed the attained social
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equalization of the Czech lands and Slovakia but rather in the
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specificities of the recent development of the two societies after the
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`''Velvet Revolution''''. Anyway, the contradictory shape of the popular
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attitudes became one of the stimuli that helped the victory of more
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liberal and pro-federalist rifht-wing political parties in the Czech
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Republic and rather anti-federalist political parties and movements in
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Slovakia in the elections of 1992. The election victors decided after
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relatively short negotiations, without asking people in a referendum, to
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dissociate the common state of Czechs and Slovaks. It happened at the
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beginning of 1993 in peaceful way and is acknowledged at present as a
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matter of fact by majorities of populations in both new states.
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It is highly interesting by now to find out what have been the further
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destinies of people in both countries as far as the objective positions
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and the subjective attitudes are concerned. A substantial contribution
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to this kind of knowledge could bring large representative sociological
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surveys of about 5000 adult respondents in the Czech and Slovak Republic
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that took place in April 1993 as a part of broader comparative survey on
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social stratification and mobility in Eastern Europe. The second
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important contribution could be drawn from paralel surveys of somewhat
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smaller representative samples devoted to the study of beliefs and
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behaviour of Czech and Slovak people carried out in autumn 1993.
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As far as the objective aspect of the problem is concerned, one can
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state that the economically active population of the Czech and Slovak
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Republics do not differ in none of the basic social status dimensions
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characterizing the individuals. Even the indicators of the so called
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status consistency/inconsistency, namely the rank correlations of
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education, work complexity and earnings are equal in both republics.
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Small differences have been revealed only in two newly studied status
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characteristics. The so-called social capital (the degree of development
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of purposeful informal social contacts) seems to be somewhat more
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developed in Slovakia than in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, the
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Czech lands are a little bit more progressing in the development of the
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private enterpreneurship. However, the differences are not so deep as to
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make the social stratification shape of the two societies fundamentally
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dissimilar. Thus the data concerning the social positions of
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economically active individuals prove clearly that Slovakia reached
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approximately the same level od social and cultural development as the
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Czech Republic.
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There exist, of course, some not negligible differences concerning
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social and cultural characteristics of the families, including their
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economically non-active members.
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In Slovakia, significantly more respondents declared that they were
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living in family houses. The technical equipment of the housing is
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somewhat better in the Czech lands, the size of the family flats or
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houses and the number of rooms is larger in Slovakia. The material
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equipment of the households differs somewhat in some items in favour of
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the Czech families, in some others in favour of the Slovak. The average
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amount of their family fortunes expressed in financial values seems to
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be a little higher in Slovakia. The Czech families are not so numerous
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as the relatively younger Slovak families and therefore their average
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income per capita is higher. Among the population that has been
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questioned in the stratification survey there was substantially less
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retired persons in the Slovak Republic. The percentage of unemployed
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among the respondents has been, on the contrary, some times higher in
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Slovakia. However, the final percentage of economically active was
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higher in Slovakia.
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All these characteristics are connected with well known differences of
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the two countries in the settlement structure and in the structure of
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industries and branches in national economy. In the Slovak Republic,
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significantly more people are working in agriculture, metallurgy, heavy
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industry and energetics, yet also in education, culture ans science; in
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the Czech Republic the same goes for other industry, other services,
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finance and banking. Also the already mentioned differences in the
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demographic structures play their role as well as the differences in the
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ethnical structures (large Hungarian and Gipsy minority in Slovakia) and
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in confessional structures (substantially more believers, particularly
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Roman Catholics but also Evangelics in Slovakia).
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If we take into account all the mentioned social and cultural
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differences, some of them favourable for the Czech, some for the Slovak
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Republic, we cannot notice, of course, that they are in a part derived
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from the more rural and traditional past of Slovakia as we analyzed it
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in on the basis of 1967 data. However, in the whole the weight of this
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kind of differences is not as high that it could change our basic
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statement about achieved fundamental cultural and social equality of the
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societies in question, which both now belong to the industrial type and
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started together a very similar trajectory of the post-communist
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transformation.
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However, there is one important field where the recently emerged
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differences seem to be grave. It is the standard of living of the
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households.
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In every case, we can present interesting data comparing the evaluation
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of family standards of living in the Czech lands and Slovakia in 1988
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and in 1993. In spite of the fact that they are somewhat subjectively
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coloured, especially as far as the retrospective evaluation is
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concerned, they clearly show that the obvious decline of the standard of
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living in both republics must have been much steeper in Slovakia. At the
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same time, we have here the first evidence proving the big shift of
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satisfaction/dissatisfaction attitudes in favour of the Czech lands.
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This opens the discussion of the important topic of subjective
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perception of the post-communist transformation. The evaluation, based
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on new experience, is in both republics somewhat more sceptical than in
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1991. At the same time, a remarkable change in the relation of positive
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evaluations occurred in favour of the Czech Republic. In this case also
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the experience of nine months of Slovak sovereignty evidently plays a
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certain role. In most of similar questions one can identify a constant
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phenomenon: 20-25\% less of positive and more of negative evaluations in
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Slovakia than in the Czech lands.
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||||
|
||||
The discrepancy between the relative equality of general cultural and
|
||||
|
||||
social structures in the analyzed countries, on the one hand, and big
|
||||
|
||||
differences in the subjective evaluations, on the other, for the first
|
||||
|
||||
time revealed in the data from 1991, emerged from the data of 1993 with
|
||||
|
||||
an even greater intensity. There are, in principle, three ways how to
|
||||
|
||||
interpret this phenomenon.
|
||||
|
||||
The first would be to query the first of the premises of our
|
||||
|
||||
considerations by arguing that the residues of the traditional rural
|
||||
|
||||
cultural and social relations in Slovakia are still alive, particularly
|
||||
|
||||
in times of new crucial changes, and hamper the operating of relatively
|
||||
|
||||
young and therefore unstable cultural and social relationships. However,
|
||||
|
||||
the facts witnessing for basic equality of the present cultural and
|
||||
|
||||
social structures are substantial and concern nearly all aspects of the
|
||||
|
||||
daily life in both societies, so that it is not so easy to doubt them.
|
||||
|
||||
There is a case for another explanation as well, namely for the
|
||||
|
||||
assumption that in the stormy atmosphere of radical social changes some
|
||||
|
||||
deep cultural and socio-psychological specificities of the nations
|
||||
|
||||
concerned emerge, which are responsible for the different reactions to
|
||||
|
||||
relatively equal situations. Neither these phenomena and mechanisms,
|
||||
|
||||
taken alone, can explain the abruptness and intensity of the change in
|
||||
|
||||
attitudes in the Czech lands and in Slovakia. In addition, the cultural
|
||||
|
||||
and psychological phenomena are in principle very vague and their
|
||||
|
||||
empirical fixation is unusually difficult. One could not notice that
|
||||
|
||||
therefore this kind of argumentation has been recently many times abused
|
||||
|
||||
by nationalist politicians both in Slovakia and in the Czech lands on
|
||||
|
||||
the basis of arbitrary assumptions and statements.
|
||||
|
||||
That is why we offer a third hypothesis, interpreting the stated
|
||||
|
||||
discrepancy from the angle of the specificities of social and historical
|
||||
|
||||
dynamics. It tries to explain the differences in attitudes as rationally
|
||||
|
||||
arguable reactions of two neighbouring nations to historically different
|
||||
|
||||
combinations of long-term and short-term dynamics.
|
||||
|
||||
It is undisputable, that from the fall of the 1930s, Slovakia, a former
|
||||
|
||||
agrarian and economically underdeveloped region, moved - with short
|
||||
|
||||
breaks only - steadily in the direction to an industrial and relatively
|
||||
|
||||
modern society with growing political authority. Although the Slovaks
|
||||
|
||||
did not like communism (as the results of the elections in 1946 clearly
|
||||
|
||||
showed) and had to be forced to adapt themselves to the state-socialist
|
||||
|
||||
system (as the events in 1947 and 1948 prove), paradoxically the peak of
|
||||
|
||||
the modernization of their society, bringing hitherto the best living
|
||||
|
||||
conditions for the population, has been achieved during the period of
|
||||
|
||||
`''normalization'''', i.e. on the top of the development of the
|
||||
|
||||
totalitarian and anti-meritocratic (egalitarian) social system in
|
||||
|
||||
Czechoslovakia. It is quite clear from this that typical ideologies of
|
||||
|
||||
the state socialist era: egalitarianism, state paternalism and
|
||||
|
||||
authoritarianism have far deeper roots in Slovakia than in the Czech
|
||||
|
||||
Republic.
|
||||
|
||||
The social experience of a long-term trajectory of a gradual rise and
|
||||
|
||||
emancipation of the Slovak nation clashed at once after 1989 with a
|
||||
|
||||
contradictory experience of a rapid decline and deteriorization of the
|
||||
|
||||
economic and social conditions, much more intensive than in the Czech
|
||||
|
||||
lands. It is no wonder that the Slovak population reacted to the new
|
||||
|
||||
situation in a greater extent than the Czech with feelings of
|
||||
|
||||
frustration, resignation or even refusal.
|
||||
|
||||
The social experience of the Czech nation since the end of the 1930s has
|
||||
|
||||
been substatially different. In the rude trajectory of development until
|
||||
|
||||
the end of the 1980s, degradation and stagnation of a formerly well
|
||||
|
||||
developed Central European land prevailed in general. A short
|
||||
|
||||
contradictory wave of a renewed progress in the 1960s finished by a
|
||||
|
||||
grave frustration from the defeat of the Prague spring. The Soviet
|
||||
|
||||
occupation meant a real lost of national sovereignty for the Czech
|
||||
|
||||
nation that never accepted it. After the lost of illusions about the
|
||||
|
||||
possibilities of the Soviet `''perestroika'''' and after a certain
|
||||
|
||||
deteriorization of the standard of living in the second half of the
|
||||
|
||||
1980s, the Czech nation was mentally prepared for a `''return to
|
||||
|
||||
Europe''''. The subsequent decline in the first phase of the
|
||||
|
||||
post-communist transformation was the slightest one among the Central
|
||||
|
||||
and East European countries and the signs of some improvement showed
|
||||
|
||||
very early. It is no wonder, again, that most people are relatively more
|
||||
|
||||
satisfied with the development until now and more optimistic about the
|
||||
|
||||
future than the Slovak population is. It does not mean, of course that
|
||||
|
||||
there does not exist a danger of a later desillusion of a part of
|
||||
|
||||
society and of some rise of feelings of frustration and resignation in
|
||||
|
||||
the future.
|
||||
|
||||
It is easy to see that this kind of interpretation of our data is
|
||||
|
||||
rational and corresponds the historical facts found out or corroborated
|
||||
|
||||
in our surveys. It can explain without distortion of the evident
|
||||
|
||||
historical reality most of the seeming paradoxes of the Czech and Slovak
|
||||
|
||||
reality and mutual relationships. In a way it gives also some keys to
|
||||
|
||||
the explanation of the split of Czechoslovakia and of its unexpected
|
||||
|
||||
abruptness and peaceful forms.'
|
||||
affiliation: MACHONIN, P (Corresponding Author), CZECHOSLOVAK ACAD SCI, INST SOCIOL,
|
||||
VILSKA 1, CS-11000 PRAGUE, CZECH REPUBLIC.
|
||||
author: MACHONIN, P
|
||||
author_list:
|
||||
- family: MACHONIN
|
||||
given: P
|
||||
da: '2023-09-28'
|
||||
eissn: 1336-8613
|
||||
files: []
|
||||
issn: 0049-1225
|
||||
journal: SOCIOLOGIA
|
||||
keywords: 'VELVET REVOLUTION; PEACEFUL DISSOCIATION OF THE FEDERAL CZECHOSLOVAKIA;
|
||||
|
||||
TRANSFORMATION PROCESSES'
|
||||
keywords-plus: CZECHOSLOVAKIA
|
||||
language: Slovak
|
||||
number: '4'
|
||||
number-of-cited-references: '15'
|
||||
pages: 333+
|
||||
papis_id: 3691e723557b9331d8c334b99baf2c58
|
||||
ref: Machonin1994sociologicalcomparis
|
||||
times-cited: '7'
|
||||
title: TOWARDS SOCIOLOGICAL COMPARISON OF CZECH AND SLOVAK SOCIETY
|
||||
type: Article
|
||||
unique-id: WOS:A1994QG72500002
|
||||
usage-count-last-180-days: '1'
|
||||
usage-count-since-2013: '54'
|
||||
volume: '26'
|
||||
web-of-science-categories: Sociology
|
||||
year: '1994'
|
||||
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