Add wos sample results library

02-data/intermediate/wos_sample/5d155ca56e74148b1a11790901f61928-bisio-laura-and-car/info.yaml

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+abstract: 'PurposeWithin the two-tier bargaining system, the role of complementary
+
+  collective bargaining is somewhat controversial. In this paper, the
+
+  authors analyse collective agreements from a triple perspective:
+
+  scanning the contents of firm-level complementary collective agreements
+
+  (CCAs); identifying the factors that determine the probability of
+
+  signing a CCA and analysing the relationship between the latter and firm
+
+  performance with a focus on the role of different negotiated
+
+  topics.Design/methodology/approachThe empirical procedure is based on 2
+
+  main linked sources: longitudinal balance sheet data and a
+
+  cross-sectional dataset of a representative sample of Italian firms with
+
+  at least 15 employees, including some retrospective information. The
+
+  innovative dataset derives from integrating multiple sources. The main
+
+  empirical approaches include Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
+
+  estimations, multivariate regressions, as well as instrumental variable
+
+  (IV) estimations to overcome simultaneity issues.FindingsWith respect to
+
+  the probability of signing a CCA, on the firms'' side, the authors find a
+
+  positive role of the degree of firm capitalisation and affiliation with
+
+  an employers'' association and a negative role of family firms compared
+
+  to non-family firms; on the workers'' side, a positive role of the
+
+  workers'' unionisation rate and a positive but differentiated weight of
+
+  workers'' union representations and industrial conflicts. With regard to
+
+  firm performance, the authors'' estimates suggest that signing a CCA is
+
+  associated with an average increase of 3\% in total factor productivity
+
+  (TFP) and 7.8\% in labour productivity. By investigating the contents of
+
+  the complementarity agreements, the authors show that bargaining a wider
+
+  range of topics implies advantages that are not homogenous, benefitting
+
+  more efficient firms. Moreover, the authors find a specific positive and
+
+  significant role for three main interacting issues: economic incentives,
+
+  organisation and employment.Research limitations/implicationsThe
+
+  cross-sectional structure of the data on bargaining practices prevents
+
+  detecting causal relationships due to either potential common driver(s)
+
+  of both the target variables (firm performance) and bargaining practices
+
+  (simultaneity bias) and unobservable time-invariant firm-level
+
+  characteristics (heterogeneity bias).Practical implicationsAccording to
+
+  the authors'' results, policymakers should operate along four fiscal
+
+  channels to spur the efficiency of firms, via CCA. First, tax incentives
+
+  stimulate higher firm capitalisation, as this seems to be a
+
+  CCA-favouring factor. Second, deduction in taxable income for union
+
+  members, which should led to higher membership rates, hence raising the
+
+  likelihood of obtaining a CCA. Third, incentives aimed at directly
+
+  promoting the greater diffusion of CCAs as a source of improved
+
+  performance. Fourth, fiscal tools aimed at favouring the negotiation of
+
+  either specific contents or ``bundles{''''} of contents, which the
+
+  authors'' estimates show as an additional performance-enhancing tool of
+
+  CCA practices.Originality/valueThe conceptualisation of the contents of
+
+  CCA as organisational investments and the whole probability function of
+
+  signing a CCA are quite innovative. Moreover, the econometric strategy
+
+  takes account of several potential sources of bias when estimating the
+
+  relevant coefficients at each stage, which is currently not fully
+
+  considered in the literature.
+
+  Finally, this is the first study to shed light on both the diverse
+
+  outcomes associated with different negotiated topics (in terms of
+
+  quantity and quality) and the distinction between short and medium-long
+
+  term effects.'
+affiliation: 'Bisio, L; Cardinaleschi, S (Corresponding Author), ISTAT Italian Natl
+  Inst Stat, Rome, Italy.
+
+  Leoni, R (Corresponding Author), Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy.
+
+  Bisio, Laura; Cardinaleschi, Stefania, ISTAT Italian Natl Inst Stat, Rome, Italy.
+
+  Leoni, Riccardo, Univ Bergamo, Dept Econ, Bergamo, Italy.
+
+  Leoni, Riccardo, Interuniv Res Ctr Ezio Tarantelli, Rome, Italy.'
+author: Bisio, Laura and Cardinaleschi, Stefania and Leoni, Riccardo
+author-email: 'bisio@istat.it
+
+  cardinal@istat.it
+
+  riccardo.leoni08@gmail.com'
+author_list:
+- family: Bisio
+  given: Laura
+- family: Cardinaleschi
+  given: Stefania
+- family: Leoni
+  given: Riccardo
+da: '2023-09-28'
+doi: 10.1108/IJM-06-2021-0373
+earlyaccessdate: JAN 2023
+eissn: 1758-6577
+files: []
+issn: 0143-7720
+journal: INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANPOWER
+keywords: 'Productivity; Employee participation; Collective bargaining; Labour and
+
+  management relations'
+keywords-plus: 'LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; INFORMATION-TECHNOLOGY; WORKS COUNCILS; FLEXIBLE
+
+  PAY; WAGES; PANEL; FAMILY; REPRESENTATION; COMPETE; REFORM'
+language: English
+month: MAY 31
+number: '4'
+number-of-cited-references: '63'
+orcid-numbers: Leoni, Riccardo/0000-0002-8649-3672
+pages: 728-754
+papis_id: 14dc28eaef2b100e9853bb91616814c6
+ref: Bisio2023complementarycollect
+times-cited: '0'
+title: 'Complementary collective bargaining and firm performance: new evidence for
+  Italian firms'
+type: Article
+unique-id: WOS:000919414700001
+usage-count-last-180-days: '5'
+usage-count-since-2013: '6'
+volume: '44'
+web-of-science-categories: Industrial Relations \& Labor; Management
+year: '2023'