author: Alexiou, C., & Trachanas, E. 
year: 2023
title: "The impact of trade unions and government party orientation on income inequality: Evidence from 17 OECD economies"
publisher: Journal of Economic Studies
uri: https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-12-2021-0612
pubtype: article
discipline: economics

country: global
period:
maxlength:
targeting:
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data:

design:
method:
sample:
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causal: # 0 correlation / 1 causal

theory: power resources theory
limitations: can not account for individual drivers such as collective bargaining, arbitration, etc
observation:
  - intervention: collective action (trade unionization)
    institutional: 1
    structural: 1
    agency: 0
    inequality: income; gender
    type: # 0 vertical / 1 horizontal
    indicator: # 0 absolute / 1 relative
    measures: Gini coeff
    findings: unionization strongly related with decreasing income inequalityi; right-wing institutional contexts related with increased income inequality
    channels: redistribution of political power under unions; weak unionization increases post-redistribution inequality
    direction: # -1 neg / 0 none / 1 pos
    significance: # 0 nsg / 1 msg / 2 sg

notes:
annotation: |
  A study on the effects of both political orientation of governments' parties and a country's trade unionization on its income inequality.
  It finds that, generally, strong unionization is strongly related to decreasing income inequality, most likely through a redistribution of political power through collective mobilization in national contexts of stronger unions.
  It also suggests that in contexts of weaker unionization, post-redistribution income inequality is higher, thus also fostering unequal redistributive policies. 
  Lastly, it finds positive relations between right-wing orientation of a country's government and its income inequality, with more mixed results for centrist governments pointing to potential fragmentations in their redistributive policy approaches.
  The study is mostly limited in not being able to account for individual drivers (or barriers) and can thus not disaggregate for the effects for example arbitration or collective bargaining.
