From c9981e11364bb6d3f6b5ecbc1fb0a133cd3e6baa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Marty Oehme Date: Thu, 8 Sep 2022 15:48:01 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Add footnote explaining other official flows --- _drivers-of-inequality-vietnam.qmd | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/_drivers-of-inequality-vietnam.qmd b/_drivers-of-inequality-vietnam.qmd index a9c96f5..79eb8f7 100644 --- a/_drivers-of-inequality-vietnam.qmd +++ b/_drivers-of-inequality-vietnam.qmd @@ -225,9 +225,11 @@ with the overall monetary curve closely following that of loan contributions. Thus, while loans constituted almost triple the USD amount of grants to Vietnam in 2011, this number even climbed to almost 5 times the amount in 2014, before falling to just over 2.5 times the amount of USD in loans compared to grants in 2020. -A large share of development aid contributions to Vietnam are also made up from other official flows, non-export credits, +A large share of development aid contributions to Vietnam are also made up from other official flows[^officialflows], a share which started equal to the absolute grant amount of USD contributed, rose steeply in 2013 to double the amount and fell equally steeply back to its original level in 2019. +[^officialflows]: Other official flows, per OECD CRS definition, describe contributions that do not meet the ODA criteria. These can include grants for primarily representational or commercial purposes, contributions having a grant element under the required share of 25% or primarily export-facilitating contributions. See https://doi.org/10.1787/6afef3df-en for a full definition. + ```{python} #| label: fig-vnm-aid-donortype #| fig-cap: "Total ODA for Vietnam per year, separated by donor type"